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ContrastAPI

by com.contrastcyber

Phishing Check

phishing_check
Read-onlyIdempotent

Query URLhaus for a specific URL and its host. is_malicious is True only when there is ACTIVE evidence — exact URL match with url_status='online' (or unknown) OR host has urls_online > 0. URLhaus retains historical records forever, so a host can have url_count > 0 with urls_online == 0; in that case is_malicious=False, is_stale=True, threat_level='low'. Use for URL-level threat assessment; use threat_intel for domain-level checks. Companion threat-investigation tools: ioc_lookup (multi-source IOC: ThreatFox + URLhaus + Feodo Tracker, auto-detect type), hash_lookup (file-hash malware family, MalwareBazaar), threat_intel (domain-level URLhaus only). Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {url, host, is_malicious, is_stale, urlhaus_host:{found,urls_online,url_count}, urlhaus_url:{found,threat,tags,status}, threat_level, summary}.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlYesFull URL to check, including protocol (e.g. 'https://suspicious-login.com/verify', 'http://evil.com/payload.exe')

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description discloses the nuanced logic of is_malicious, staleness, historical record retention, rate limits, and the meaning of threat_level. This goes well beyond the annotations, which only indicate read-only safe operations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but not bloated; each sentence contributes essential behavioral or usage context. The return field list is somewhat redundant given the output schema, but the overall structure is well-organized and front-loaded with the primary purpose.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter tool with rich annotations and an output schema, the description is exceptionally complete. It explains the matching logic, staleness, rate limits, and alternative tools, leaving little ambiguity for an agent to invoke it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema already covers the single 'url' parameter 100%, so baseline is 3. The description adds semantic meaning by explaining exact URL matching versus host-based checks and how the parameter feeds into the URLhaus logic, which is valuable context beyond the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states it queries URLhaus for a specific URL and its host, with a specific verb and resource. It explicitly distinguishes itself from sibling tools by naming threat_intel for domain-level checks and ioc_lookup/hash_lookup as alternatives.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly says 'Use for URL-level threat assessment; use threat_intel for domain-level checks' and lists companion tools with their purposes. This gives clear when-to-use and alternative guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, with differences between lookup/search/scan/audit for each domain. However, some overlap exists (e.g., email_mx vs email_security_posture, scan_headers vs contrast_scan) which could cause occasional confusion. Overall, boundaries are well-defined.

Naming Consistency5/5

Tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern (e.g., cve_lookup, check_headers, bulk_cve_lookup) with all lowercase underscores. Variations like kev_detail or ssl_check are minor and still predictable. No chaotic mixing of conventions.

Tool Count4/5

54 tools is high but justified by the broad cybersecurity scope (CVE, ATLAS, D3FEND, Sigma, domain, email, IOC, scanning). Some redundancy exists (e.g., three email-related tools), but the count is not excessive given the API's comprehensive feature set.

Completeness5/5

The tool set thoroughly covers the threat intelligence and domain investigation lifecycle: CVE/KEV/exploit/CWE, ATLAS/D3FEND/Sigma, DNS/WHOIS/SSL/subdomains, email security, IOC enrichment, and active scanning. No significant gaps are apparent for the stated cybersecurity purpose.

Resources