Skip to main content
Glama

IOC Lookup

ioc_lookup
Read-onlyIdempotent

Enrich Indicator of Compromise (IP/domain/URL/hash) by auto-detecting type and querying abuse.ch feeds. Per-type source coverage: hash → ThreatFox only (Feodo and URLhaus do not index hashes); IP → ThreatFox + Feodo Tracker + URLhaus; domain / URL → ThreatFox + URLhaus. verdict.sources_queried lists what actually ran; verdict.sources_unavailable lists what failed (timeout / upstream error). Use as primary IOC triage tool when type unknown; use threat_intel for domain-only, hash_lookup for richer MalwareBazaar hash data. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {indicator, type, threat_level, sources, summary, verdict}.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
indicatorYesIndicator of Compromise: IP address, domain, full URL, or file hash in MD5/SHA1/SHA256 format (e.g. '8.8.8.8', 'evil.com', 'https://evil.com/malware.exe', 'd41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e')

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

TDQS

A4.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, openWorld, idempotent, and non-destructive behavior. The description goes beyond by explaining auto-detection of IOC type, per-type source coverage (e.g., hash → ThreatFox only), and the presence of sources_queried and sources_unavailable fields to signal what actually ran. No contradictions detected.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is longer than average but every sentence contributes new information: source coverage, alternative tools, rate limits, and return shape. It is front-loaded with the core purpose, then expands into details, making it efficiently scannable despite density.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

This is a multi-source enrichment tool with no output schema to fall back on, but the description covers types, sources, failure handling (sources_unavailable), rate limits, and alternatives. It also mentions the return fields (indicator, type, threat_level, sources, summary, verdict), making it fully self-contained for an agent to select and invoke correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The schema already documents the single 'indicator' parameter with examples, so the baseline is 3. The description adds significant semantic context: auto-detection, per-type source coverage, and the meaning of verdict fields, which clarifies not just the parameter format but how the tool interprets it.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb + resource ('Enrich Indicator of Compromise') and enumerates accepted types (IP/domain/URL/hash). It also explicitly differentiates from sibling tools by naming threat_intel and hash_lookup as alternatives, making its role clear.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description states when to use this tool ('primary IOC triage tool when type unknown') and when not to, recommending threat_intel for domain-only and hash_lookup for richer MalwareBazaar data. It also provides rate limits (30/hr free, 500/hr Pro), giving concrete context for invocation.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, with differences between lookup/search/scan/audit for each domain. However, some overlap exists (e.g., email_mx vs email_security_posture, scan_headers vs contrast_scan) which could cause occasional confusion. Overall, boundaries are well-defined.

Naming Consistency5/5

Tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern (e.g., cve_lookup, check_headers, bulk_cve_lookup) with all lowercase underscores. Variations like kev_detail or ssl_check are minor and still predictable. No chaotic mixing of conventions.

Tool Count4/5

54 tools is high but justified by the broad cybersecurity scope (CVE, ATLAS, D3FEND, Sigma, domain, email, IOC, scanning). Some redundancy exists (e.g., three email-related tools), but the count is not excessive given the API's comprehensive feature set.

Completeness5/5

The tool set thoroughly covers the threat intelligence and domain investigation lifecycle: CVE/KEV/exploit/CWE, ATLAS/D3FEND/Sigma, DNS/WHOIS/SSL/subdomains, email security, IOC enrichment, and active scanning. No significant gaps are apparent for the stated cybersecurity purpose.