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ATLAS Technique Lookup

atlas_technique_lookup
Read-onlyIdempotent

Look up a MITRE ATLAS technique — the AI/ML adversarial attack catalog. ATLAS catalogues TTPs targeting machine learning systems: prompt injection, model evasion, training data poisoning, model theft, etc. Roughly 80% of ATLAS techniques are AI/ML-specific (no ATT&CK bridge); 20% mirror an enterprise ATT&CK technique via attack_reference_id — use that to pivot to D3FEND defenses (d3fend_defense_for_attack) and CVE search. Sub-techniques inherit tactics from the parent (inherited_tactics=true flag) when ATLAS upstream leaves them empty. Use this tool when the user asks about AI/ML threats, LLM red-teaming, or adversarial ML; for multiple techniques in one call (e.g. drilling into a case study's techniques_used), prefer bulk_atlas_technique_lookup. Returns 404 when the id is not in the synced ATLAS catalog. Free: 30/hr, Pro: 500/hr. Returns {technique_id, name, description, tactics, inherited_tactics, maturity (demonstrated|feasible|realized), attack_reference_id, attack_reference_url, subtechnique_of, created_date, modified_date, next_calls}.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
technique_idYesMITRE ATLAS technique id, format 'AML.T####' or 'AML.T####.###' for sub-techniques (e.g. 'AML.T0000', 'AML.T0051' LLM Prompt Injection, 'AML.T0000.000').

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and idempotentHint=true, but the description adds meaningful behavioral context: rate limits (30/hr free, 500/hr Pro), 404 behavior when the id is not found, sub-technique inherited_tactics flag, maturity levels, and ATT&CK bridging behavior. No contradiction with annotations. This goes well beyond the basic safety hints.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is longer than strictly necessary, but it is front-loaded with the primary purpose and each sentence contributes distinct value (ATLAS explanation, ATT&CK bridge, inheritance, usage guidance, errors, rate limits, output fields). Minor redundancy exists (e.g., listing example attack types is not essential), but the structure is logical and readable. Slightly verbose, so 4.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter tool with a rich output schema, the description is exceptionally complete. It covers what the tool does, when to use it, alternatives, error behavior, rate limits, inherited sub-technique behavior, and the full return field list. There are no significant gaps in context needed for an agent to select and invoke this tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% with technique_id format and examples fully documented in the input schema. The description does not add parameter-specific meaning beyond the schema, though it does reinforce the context (e.g., 'AML.T0051' LLM Prompt Injection). Baseline 3 is appropriate since the schema already handles parameter semantics.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb+resource: 'Look up a MITRE ATLAS technique.' It distinguishes from siblings by explicitly naming bulk_atlas_technique_lookup for multiple techniques and describing ATLAS as the AI/ML adversarial attack catalog with examples like prompt injection and model evasion. This makes the tool's purpose unmistakable and distinct from related lookup/search tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description gives explicit when-to-use guidance: 'Use this tool when the user asks about AI/ML threats, LLM red-teaming, or adversarial ML.' It also names an alternative for multiple techniques: 'for multiple techniques in one call... prefer bulk_atlas_technique_lookup.' Additionally, it suggests pivoting to d3fend_defense_for_attack and CVE search via attack_reference_id, providing clear context for related follow-ups.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, with differences between lookup/search/scan/audit for each domain. However, some overlap exists (e.g., email_mx vs email_security_posture, scan_headers vs contrast_scan) which could cause occasional confusion. Overall, boundaries are well-defined.

Naming Consistency5/5

Tool names follow a consistent verb_noun pattern (e.g., cve_lookup, check_headers, bulk_cve_lookup) with all lowercase underscores. Variations like kev_detail or ssl_check are minor and still predictable. No chaotic mixing of conventions.

Tool Count4/5

54 tools is high but justified by the broad cybersecurity scope (CVE, ATLAS, D3FEND, Sigma, domain, email, IOC, scanning). Some redundancy exists (e.g., three email-related tools), but the count is not excessive given the API's comprehensive feature set.

Completeness5/5

The tool set thoroughly covers the threat intelligence and domain investigation lifecycle: CVE/KEV/exploit/CWE, ATLAS/D3FEND/Sigma, DNS/WHOIS/SSL/subdomains, email security, IOC enrichment, and active scanning. No significant gaps are apparent for the stated cybersecurity purpose.