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by com.cluby.api
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Update webhook endpoint

update_webhook_endpoint
DestructiveIdempotent

Edit a webhook endpoint (requires the admin role). Only the fields sent change; a secret sent replaces the stored one. Events are POSTed as JSON with an HMAC signature in X-Cluby-Signature (t=<unix>,v1=<hex hmac-sha256(secret, "<t>.<body>")>). Event types: smart_link.scanned (A member scanned a smart link or NFC tag whose target names a venue (sent to every endpoint subscribed to it; posRef only to the endpoint the tag is tied to).). Includes (optional sections added to each event's data): profile (The member's display name, profile photo URL and the date they joined the event's venue.), membershipCards (Membership / VIP cards the member holds at the venue, valid now.), benefits (Benefits the member can activate at the venue right now — a spent one, one outside its schedule, or a members-only one the member does not hold is left out (name, price text, and for the POS channel an actionId and its single-use redeemUrl).), stampCards (The member's stamp cards in the organization, with stamps and the number to fill (and for the POS channel an actionId and awardStampUrl on the cards that run at the scanned venue).), items (Items the member holds that are usable at the scanned venue — rewards earned (a full stamp card, a birthday gift) and products bought — with units left (and for the POS channel an actionId and a useUrl, good for as many uses as there are units, at most 10).).

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlNoA public HTTPS URL. Private, link-local and loopback addresses are refused, and redirects are not followed.
nameNoA label for lists and alerts. The URL's host by default.
orgIdNoOrganization public id, the `id` field from list_orgs. Omit it when the API key reaches exactly one organization.
eventsNoThe event types to receive. `smart_link.scanned` by default.
secretNoThe key events are signed with. Omit it to have one generated (`whsec_…`), returned once and never again. Use the whole string, prefix included, as the HMAC key. A new one replaces the old at once.
enabledNo`false` stops deliveries without deleting the endpoint.
includesNoWhat each event carries beyond its own data: `profile`, `membershipCards`, `benefits`, `stampCards`, `items`. None by default; a POS connection's own endpoint gets all of them.
endpointIdYesWebhook endpoint `id` from list_webhook_endpoints

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed7 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / enabled / description
      Added value: +"`false` stops deliveries without deleting the endpoint."
    • addedInput schema / properties / events / description
      Added value: +"The event types to receive. `smart_link.scanned` by default."
    • addedInput schema / properties / includes / description
      Added value: +"What each event carries beyond its own data: `profile`, `membershipCards`, `benefits`, `stampCards`, `items`. None by default; a POS connection's own endpoint gets all of them."
    • changedInput schema / properties / includes / items / enum
      Previous value: -[
-  "profile",
-  "membershipCards",
-  "benefits",
-  "stampCards"
-]New value: +[
+  "profile",
+  "membershipCards",
+  "benefits",
+  "stampCards",
+  "items"
+]
    • addedInput schema / properties / name / description
      Added value: +"A label for lists and alerts. The URL's host by default."
    • addedInput schema / properties / secret / description
      Added value: +"The key events are signed with. Omit it to have one generated (`whsec_…`), returned once and never again. Use the whole string, prefix included, as the HMAC key. A new one replaces the old at once."
    • addedInput schema / properties / url / description
      Added value: +"A public HTTPS URL. Private, link-local and loopback addresses are refused, and redirects are not followed."
  2. Added

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true; the description backs the destructive claim with "a `secret` sent replaces the stored one" and adds signing details (HMAC-SHA256 over `<t>.<body>` in `X-Cluby-Signature`) that no annotation covers. It does not say what happens to endpoints still holding the old secret after rotation, nor what the call returns, which is the remaining behavioral gap.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness2/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The operative content is two short clauses at the front; everything after that is a long payload/signature reference with deeply nested parentheses (e.g. the `smart_link.scanned` and `items` entries) that is tangential to editing an endpoint. Much of it restates what the event documentation and schema already cover, so the description is far larger than the call it describes.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, and the description says nothing about the return value of an update (the fact that a generated secret is returned once lives only in the schema). For a destructive, partial-update mutation with 8 parameters, it covers input semantics well but leaves the post-call contract implicit.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3; the description goes beyond it by explaining what each `includes` section actually puts into `data` (profile, membershipCards, benefits, stampCards, items) and what `smart_link.scanned` delivers, which the enum-only schema does not convey. Some of that detail, like `posRef` routing, is narrower than an update caller needs.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The first clause states a specific verb and resource ("Edit a webhook endpoint") plus the admin-role prerequisite, which clearly separates it from create_webhook_endpoint, delete_webhook_endpoint and test_webhook_endpoint. It never names a sibling explicitly, so differentiation is implied by the verb rather than stated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives one genuinely useful usage rule — "Only the fields sent change" (PATCH semantics) — and the admin-role gate. It never says when to prefer this over deleting/recreating an endpoint, when to use test_webhook_endpoint to verify, or when to set enabled=false instead of deleting; those choices are left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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