mcp_tools
Connect to one public MCP server (streamable HTTP, https) and list its tools with their input...
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | Yes |
Connect to one public MCP server (streamable HTTP, https) and list its tools with their input...
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / properties / url / descriptionRemoved value: -"the server's https MCP url, e.g. from mcp_find"Input schema / properties / url / descriptionAdded value: +"the server's https MCP url, e.g. from mcp_find"Input schema / properties / url / descriptionRemoved value: -"the server's https MCP url, e.g. from mcp_find"Input schema / properties / url / descriptionAdded value: +"the server's https MCP url, e.g. from mcp_find"Input schema / properties / url / descriptionRemoved value: -"the server's https MCP url, e.g. from mcp_find"Input schema / properties / url / descriptionAdded value: +"the server's https MCP url, e.g. from mcp_find"Input schema / properties / url / descriptionRemoved value: -"the server's https MCP url, e.g. from mcp_find"Input schema / properties / url / descriptionAdded value: +"the server's https MCP url, e.g. from mcp_find"Input schema / properties / url / propertiesRemoved value: -nullInput schema / properties / url / descriptionRemoved value: -"the server's https MCP url, e.g. from mcp_find"Input schema / properties / url / propertiesAdded value: +nullDoes the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuine transport context — streamable HTTP over HTTPS, and only one server at a time — but the sentence is truncated, so likely behavioral detail (what is returned, whether the connection is cached or persisted) is missing.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
It is short and front-loaded, but the trailing ellipsis means the description is literally incomplete rather than tight. Brevity here comes from truncation, not from editing out waste.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema and an undocumented parameter, the description must carry the burden of explaining what the tool returns (a list of tool names plus input schemas) and how failures surface. It ends before making that clear, so an agent cannot tell what the response shape will be.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has zero description coverage for the single `url` parameter. The description partially compensates by constraining it to a public MCP server reachable via streamable HTTP over HTTPS, which an agent can infer means an https:// endpoint. It still says nothing about format, trailing paths, or auth-free requirements.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a concrete verb+resource pair (connect to an MCP server and list its tools), which is better than a tautology. But it is cut off mid-sentence ("with their input...") and never distinguishes itself from nearby siblings such as mcp_find, mcp_list, mcp_use, tool_describe, or tools_search. An agent can guess the purpose but cannot confidently route between the mcp_* family.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is an implicit constraint ("one public MCP server", HTTPS only) but no explicit statement of when to use this instead of mcp_use or tools_search. No prerequisites, no exclusions, no mention of what happens on an unreachable or unlisted server.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.