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Type into element

browser_type
Destructive

Type into a text field, textarea, or contenteditable from the latest observation. A non-editable element (editable: false, such as a submit button) returns ELEMENT_NOT_INTERACTABLE and does not change the page. length is the number of Unicode code points. A number, date, time, week, month, or color input that cannot hold the text returns INVALID_INPUT_VALUE and does not set the value. The typed value is not stored in the audit log. Events are not isTrusted; Browse Bridge does not spoof that flag. On a sensitive site, type returns APPROVAL_REQUIRED with approvalId. Password fields return HUMAN_INPUT_REQUIRED — the human types that value; there is no Approve that types a password.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
textYes
submitNo
elementIdYes
sessionIdYes
observationIdYes
idempotencyKeyNoA key replays the original result only within ~60 seconds of the first call, only for the same Mcp-Session-Id, the same credential (API key or OAuth token), the same browser session, and the same tool. After the window, or under a different session/credential/tool, the call executes and bills normally. Reusing a key with different arguments returns IDEMPOTENCY_KEY_REUSED and is not executed or billed. Refusals (e.g. NO_HISTORY_ENTRY) are not cached, so the same key re-executes once state changes. A key passed in _meta is ignored.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the destructive/openWorld annotations: discloses that typed values are excluded from the audit log, that generated events are not isTrusted and the flag is not spoofed, that failed typing leaves page state untouched, and that password fields cannot be approved-and-typed. This is exactly the safety-critical context an agent needs before mutating a page.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action, then dense failure-mode clauses; every sentence carries distinct information, including the useful note that there is no Approve path for passwords. It is a long unbroken block with no structural grouping, which slightly hurts scannability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 6-parameter, non-idempotent, destructive browser action with no output schema, the description covers the failure modes, approval flow, trust flags, and audit behavior thoroughly. The remaining gaps are the undocumented 'submit' flag and the absence of any statement about what a successful call returns.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 17%, so the description must carry the load. It clarifies text semantics (length counted in Unicode code points) and the failure behavior tied to elementId's editability, but leaves 'submit' completely unexplained and adds nothing on sessionId or observationId, so several parameters remain opaque in both places.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (type) and precisely scoped resources (text field, textarea, contenteditable), plus the precondition that it operates from the latest observation. The resource list implicitly separates it from browser_select (dropdowns) and browser_press_key (key events) among siblings.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives clear conditions and exclusions for the tool's own operation: non-editable elements return ELEMENT_NOT_INTERACTABLE, invalid input types return INVALID_INPUT_VALUE, sensitive sites require APPROVAL_REQUIRED, and password fields must be handled by a human. It never explicitly routes to a sibling (e.g. click for buttons, select for dropdowns), which keeps it out of the top band.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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