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Delete an alert

delete_alert
Destructive

Deletes an alert for every member of a shared alert, not only the caller. The alert is archived: delivery history remains for billing, and no further runs, digests, or member reads occur. Only the owner or a team admin may delete; another member receives 403. Does not use credits. Not undoable on this surface. Confirm with the user first.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "alertId": "<alertId>"
    },
    "name": "delete_alert"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
alertIdYesThe planned-project alert's public id ("alr_…"), from list_alerts or create_alert. Permit alert ids ("palr_…") go to the permit alert tools.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=false, but the description goes well beyond them: it explains that deletion is an archival, that delivery history is retained for billing, that no further runs/digests/member reads occur, that no credits are consumed, and that it is not undoable on this surface. These are exactly the consequences an agent needs before invoking a destructive tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Every sentence carries distinct, decision-relevant information, and the most consequential fact — blast radius across all members — is front-loaded. There is no restatement of the title or filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter destructive mutation with full annotation coverage and no output schema, the description covers scope, auth requirements, side effects, credit cost, reversibility, and a confirmation protocol. Nothing material is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single parameter and schema description coverage is 100%, with the schema already documenting the alr_ prefix and the palr_ routing to permit alert tools. The description adds no additional parameter meaning, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource plus an important scope qualifier: it deletes the alert for every member of a shared alert, not only the caller. It does not, however, name the sibling it is not (delete_permit_alert) — that routing note lives only in the schema, so the differentiation is implicit rather than explicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states prerequisites (only the owner or a team admin may delete; others get 403) and a procedural guardrail (confirm with the user first). It stops short of explicitly pointing to alternatives such as delete_permit_alert for permit alerts, so the when-not routing is left to the schema.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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