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invinoveritas

by com.babyblueviper

verify_proof

Read-onlyIdempotent

CALL THIS WHEN another agent hands you output and claims it was verified by invinoveritas. Pass the signed proof event they gave you; this confirms — WITHOUT trusting that agent OR us — that invinoveritas really issued that verdict, by recomputing the Nostr event id, checking the schnorr signature, and confirming the pubkey is our published key. Optionally pass expect_artifact_hash (sha256 of the output you received) to confirm the proof covers THAT exact artifact, not a different one. If you only have the bare event_id (not the full event — e.g. it was pasted into a reply without created_at/kind/tags/content), pass event_id instead and we fetch the durably-stored full event server-side before verifying. Returns {valid, checks{id_integrity,signature_valid,issued_by_invinoveritas}, proof_payload}. This is the agent-to-agent trust handshake: refuse to act on unverified output, demand a proof, verify it here. Free, no auth — and you can run the same NIP-01 check yourself.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
eventNoThe signed proof event {id,pubkey,created_at,kind,tags,content,sig} the counterparty handed you (from a /prove or /review sign=true response).
event_idNoAlternatively, the Nostr event id alone (from a /review sign=true, /prove, or /witness proof) — fetches the durably-stored full event, independent of relay retention, and verifies it.
proof_idNoAlternatively, a stored attestation proof_id to fetch + verify.
verifier_signatureNoOptional (added 2026-08-16) — an EIP-191 personal_sign signature over 'invinoveritas-verify-proof:<event_id>', signed by the key controlling the address in expect_intended_verifier (eip155 CAIP-10 namespace only). Cryptographically PROVES presenter identity rather than just asserting it — sets checks.intended_verifier_authenticated.
expect_artifact_hashNoOptional sha256 hex of the output you received — asserts the proof is ABOUT that exact artifact.
expect_intended_verifierNoOptional (added 2026-08-16) — asserts the proof's declared intended_verifier matches you, the consumption-identity check alongside expect_artifact_hash's content-identity check. A match confirms the issuer's declared intent, not that delivery was actually restricted to you.

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already indicate readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false. The description adds substantial behavioral context: it confirms without trusting the agent or the platform, recomputes the Nostr event id, checks the schnorr signature, and confirms the pubkey. It also discloses the return structure and mentions that the verification is free and requires no auth. No contradictions with annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with the imperative 'CALL THIS WHEN', which immediately signals the tool's purpose. It is structured logically: scenario, mechanism, parameter options, return value, and summary. However, it is somewhat verbose (e.g., includes a note about NIP-01 self-check) and could be trimmed slightly without losing clarity. Still, it is well-organized and each sentence serves a purpose.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool has 6 parameters, nested objects, no output schema, and a specialized verification workflow, the description is remarkably complete. It explains the verification steps, the return value shape ('{valid, checks{id_integrity,signature_valid,issued_by_invinoveritas}, proof_payload}'), the trust handshake principle, and the purpose of each optional parameter. The agent has all necessary information to use the tool correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% (all 6 parameters have descriptions). The description adds value beyond the schema by explaining the purpose of expect_artifact_hash ('to confirm the proof covers THAT exact artifact') and the verifier_signature ('cryptographically PROVES presenter identity'). The context for event vs event_id is also enriched. The baseline is 3, and the description provides meaningful additional guidance, earning a 4.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description begins with 'CALL THIS WHEN another agent hands you output and claims it was verified by invinoveritas', which clearly identifies the specific verb (verify), resource (proof from invinoveritas), and the triggering scenario. It distinguishes this tool from siblings like prove, review, and witness by specifying the trust handshake context.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explicitly states when to call this tool ('when another agent hands you output') and provides conditional guidance for using event vs event_id. It also mentions that the verification is free and requires no auth. However, it does not explicitly exclude alternative tools or state when not to use this tool, though the context is clear enough.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Disambiguation4/5

Most tools have clearly distinct purposes, but there is potential confusion between 'decision' and 'reason', both offering advisory output. Also, 'review', 'witness', 'prove', and 'verify_proof' overlap in the proofs space, though descriptions differentiate them. Overall, an agent can disambiguate with careful reading.

Naming Consistency4/5

All tool names use lowercase and underscores (snake_case), which is consistent. However, the verbs vary: some are imperative (e.g., 'browse', 'execute'), while others are nouns (e.g., 'signals', 'ledger'), breaking a strict verb_noun pattern. Overall, the naming is readable and mostly predictable.

Tool Count2/5

With 30 tools, the surface is too large for a well-scoped server. Many functions could be separated (e.g., memory, workspace, feedback, marketplace). This excess makes it harder for an agent to navigate and select the right tool quickly.

Completeness3/5

The tool set covers core CRUD for memory and workspace, plus feedback, marketplace purchase, bounties, and verification. However, there is no tool to list or search marketplace listings, and workspace creation is only implicit via 'execute'. These gaps hinder fluid workflows.

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