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Verify Threats in Code

verify_threats_in_code

Verify whether modelled STRIDE/LINDDUN threats are mitigated in a scan's uploaded code or AST. If threat_id is provided, returns synchronous verdict; otherwise dispatches batch verification across all diagram threats.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
scan_idYesCode review scan id
threat_idNoOptional specific threat id/code to verify
code_contentNoOptional inline code snippet to verify
repository_idNoOptional repository id

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only declare readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint=true; the description adds the genuinely useful behavioral fact that the call is synchronous with a threat_id but fans out into an asynchronous batch dispatch without one. That branch-dependent response shape is exactly the kind of context the annotations do not carry, though it never explains the side effect that makes this non-read-only.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, zero filler, and the core purpose is front-loaded ahead of the branching behavior. Every clause earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description does the necessary work of telling the agent that a threat_id yields an immediate verdict while the batch path returns a dispatch rather than results. It stops short of describing what a verdict contains, but for a 4-parameter tool with full schema coverage this is nearly complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description goes further by explaining the semantic consequence of threat_id's presence versus absence (sync verdict vs batch dispatch), which the schema merely calls 'Optional specific threat id/code to verify'. code_content and repository_id are left to the schema, which handles them adequately.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (verify) and resource (STRIDE/LINDDUN threats) with the scope clearly bounded to a scan's uploaded code or AST. It is readily distinguishable from siblings like generate_threat_model or code_review_scan, though it never names an alternative to sharpen the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives conditional behavior (pass threat_id for a single synchronous verdict, omit it to batch-verify all diagram threats), which implies when each mode applies, but it offers no guidance on when to prefer this tool over siblings such as code_review_scan or generate_threat_model, and no stated prerequisites.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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