Skip to main content
Glama

Ariadne Nexus Institutional Quantitative Engine

Statutory Closing Safe-Harbor Certificate Oracle (OFAC Merkle + Hedonic Fair-Value)

issue_safe_harbor_certificate
Read-onlyIdempotent

Issues a KMS-attested Statutory Closing Safe-Harbor Certificate combining OFAC SDN Jaro-Winkler/LEI Merkle proof screening, multi-factor hedonic collateral fair-value attestation, and HUD-1 Line 1109 pass-through fee calculation ($95 flat or 10 bps on escrow notional). Use when: an escrow agent, title company, aviation/maritime closing attorney, or autonomous clearing agent requires a signed compliance and fair-value certificate prior to wire disbursement. Do not use when: you only need a standalone counterparty name check without collateral valuation or HUD-1 closing fee calculation (use screen_ofac_entity instead). Behavior: Read-only, deterministic, idempotent compliance and valuation oracle with zero external side effects.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "counterparty_entity": "<counterparty_entity>"
    },
    "name": "issue_safe_harbor_certificate"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
asset_classNoCollateral asset class for hedonic fair-value and LTV calibration.AVIATION_AIRFRAME
buyer_entityNoLegal name of the buyer or escrow agent.Institutional Closing Escrow Agent
asset_identifierNoTail number, IMO vessel number, parcel ID, or CUSIP.N650GA — Gulfstream G650ER
counterparty_entityYesLegal name of the seller or counterparty entity to screen against OFAC SDN.
transaction_notional_usdNoTransaction escrow notional in USD.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
toolYesExecuted MCP tool identifier.
receiptNoCryptographic payment settlement receipt ID.
buyer_entityNoBuyer or escrow agent entity name.
fee_scheduleYesHUD-1 Line 1109 pass-through certificate fee.
certificate_idYesDeterministic Safe-Harbor Certificate ID.
ofac_screeningYesOFAC SDN screening status and SHA-256 Merkle proof.
counterparty_entityNoScreened counterparty entity name.
collateral_valuationYesHedonic fair-value and recommended LTV bounds.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / properties / apiKey
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "Optional Ariadne Nexus Developer API key (\"nexus_live_...\").",
      -  "type": "string"
      -}
    • removedInput schema / properties / paymentToken
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "Optional Stripe Shared Payment Token (\"spt_...\") or settled x402 payment receipt hash (\"rcpt_...\").",
      -  "type": "string"
      -}
  2. Added

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint=false and destructiveHint=false, so the 'Read-only, deterministic, idempotent... zero external side effects' sentence is largely redundant. What the description does add beyond structured data is substantive: KMS attestation of the output, Merkle-proof construction, and the concrete fee rule ($95 flat or 10 bps on escrow notional), which tells the agent what the certificate will actually contain and cost.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action, then cleanly partitioned into Use when / Do not use when / Behavior clauses with no filler. It loses a point for dense jargon stacking ('multi-factor hedonic collateral fair-value attestation') that slows parsing, and for the Behavior sentence restating annotations the reader already has.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a high-complexity compliance oracle, the definition covers purpose, prerequisites, the excluded use case and its alternative, and the deterministic/side-effect-free profile; an output schema exists so the certificate's return shape need not be explained. Everything an agent needs to decide to call it and to populate the required counterparty_entity is present.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description nevertheless adds meaning the schema does not: it ties transaction_notional_usd to the 10 bps pass-through fee rule and frames asset_class/asset_identifier as inputs to hedonic fair-value and LTV calibration, clarifying why those fields exist rather than just what they are.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and artifact ('Issues a KMS-attested Statutory Closing Safe-Harbor Certificate') and enumerates the three computations bundled into it: OFAC SDN Jaro-Winkler/LEI Merkle screening, hedonic fair-value attestation, and HUD-1 Line 1109 fee calculation. This is clearly distinguishable from siblings such as screen_ofac_entity or calculate_clearing_fee, which each cover only a fragment.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly labels a 'Use when:' clause naming the actors (escrow agent, title company, closing attorney, autonomous clearing agent) and the triggering condition (prior to wire disbursement), then a 'Do not use when:' clause that routes single-purpose name checks to screen_ofac_entity. Both the positive and negative selection conditions are stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.