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x402 Data API (Crypto, DeFi, SEC EDGAR, Search, Embeddings, Whisper, OCR)

crypto_exploit_radar

[$0.05] Inspect EVM smart contract bytecode for DELEGATECALL, SELFDESTRUCT, and proxy upgrade vectors while cross-referencing 48-hour security and exploit feeds.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "crypto_exploit_radar"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
chainNoTarget chain (e.g. 'base', 'ethereum')base
addressNoSmart contract address (0x...) or protocol identifier
timeout_msNoOptional deadline in ms. If the local LLM would exceed it, the response comes back fast with "degraded": true and non-LLM/cached data

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.2/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are supplied, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It does disclose useful context — a $0.05 price and that results are cross-referenced against 48-hour security/exploit feeds — but it says nothing about whether the scan is read-only and side-effect free, how fresh the bytecode snapshot is, or what a finding record contains, leaving an unannotated inspection tool under-described.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single dense sentence with the price tag and the core scope front-loaded, and no filler. It is slightly overloaded by stacking the three bytecode patterns and the feed cross-reference into one clause, but nothing is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no annotations, no output schema, and all three parameters optional (address is not required), the definition should explain what the response looks like and what an empty/omitted address means. It covers the scan scope well but leaves the return shape and the no-address case entirely unaddressed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so chain, address, and timeout_ms are already fully documented in the schema, including the degraded-mode behavior. The description adds no further meaning to any parameter — it never mentions the chain selector, the address formats, or how the timeout interacts with the stated exploit-feed cross-reference.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource ('Inspect EVM smart contract bytecode') and enumerates the exact patterns hunted (DELEGATECALL, SELFDESTRUCT, proxy upgrade vectors) plus the exploit-feed cross-reference. It is clearly distinguishable from generic siblings, but it never names an alternative such as security_preflight_402 or agent_preflight, so the differentiation is implicit rather than stated.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: an agent can infer this is for auditing a contract's bytecode against recent exploit activity. There is no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, prerequisites (e.g. whether the address must be verified/deployed), or direction to a sibling tool for pre-transaction checks.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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