Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already establish readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=false, so safety is covered; the description adds genuinely new behavior by naming the two failure causes (API drift, forged certificate) and implying a pass/fail verdict. It still omits any note on cost, rate limits, or determinism.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, zero filler, and the purpose is front-loaded ahead of the failure conditions. Every clause earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description does enough by signalling that the result is a pass/fail verification and what makes it fail. It is close to complete for a 3-param read-only tool, though it does not describe the shape of the returned verdict or how failures are reported.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and both required parameters (certificate, api) are documented in-schema with type alternatives and an alias for `cert`. The description adds no format or syntax detail beyond that, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Re-verify a governance certificate') plus the target it is checked against ('the API it attests to'), which cleanly separates it from the issuing tool certify_api and from validate_api. It stops short of naming those siblings explicitly, so an agent must infer the routing.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description never says when to call this rather than certify_api, validate_api, or governance_report, and gives no preconditions (e.g. that a certificate must already exist). The failure-mode sentence describes an outcome, not a usage rule.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.