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certify_api

Read-only

Issue a tamper-evident governance certificate attesting an API passed a named ruleset at a profile threshold. A SHA-256 fingerprint lets anyone re-verify it.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
apiYesThe API description being attested or verified. String or parsed object.
contextNoOptional: why you are asking. One sentence — the task you are trying to complete, or what you expect to get back. Never included in the answer and never used to rank; it is read only when a result turns out to be wrong, which is when knowing the intent is what makes the report actionable.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / context
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Optional: why you are asking. One sentence — the task you are trying to complete, or what you expect to get back. Never included in the answer and never used to rank; it is read only when a result turns out to be wrong, which is when knowing the intent is what makes the report actionable.",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  2. Changed1 schema field changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / api
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "The API description being attested or verified. String or parsed object.",
      +  "type": [
      +    "string",
      +    "object"
      +  ]
      +}
  3. Added

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=false, so the safety profile is covered externally. The description adds real behavioral context beyond that: the certificate is tamper-evident, carries a SHA-256 fingerprint, and is re-verifiable by a third party. It still omits whether the certificate is persisted, whether issuance is idempotent, and what happens on failed attestation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences with zero filler. The core action and artifact come first, and the re-verification property is placed as supporting detail rather than preamble.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description should say more about what the agent receives back (fingerprint field, certificate body) and where the ruleset/profile threshold come from, since they are not parameters. It is adequate for a two-parameter tool but leaves the agent guessing at the return shape and the source of the attestation criteria.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the 'context' parameter is unusually well documented in the schema itself, so the description adds nothing for the two declared parameters. It is also mildly misleading: 'named ruleset' and 'profile threshold' read as inputs, but neither exists in the schema, leaving the agent unsure how those are supplied.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb (issue/certify), the artifact produced (a tamper-evident governance certificate), and the condition it attests (an API passed a named ruleset at a profile threshold). It is clearly distinguishable from list/search siblings, though it never explicitly names its closest counterpart, verify_certificate, which only appears indirectly via 'anyone re-verify it'.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: certifying makes sense once an API has passed a ruleset at a profile threshold, but the description never states that prerequisite, never names verify_certificate or governance_report as the natural next/alternative step, and gives no when-not condition. An agent can infer context but gets no routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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