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Discard an undo point

wp_undo_discard
Destructive

Throw away an undo point and its snapshot without restoring anything; this is permanent, the change it covered can then no longer be undone. Meant for a change confirmed good; all=true drops all of the account's own undo points at once. Discarding needs the same permission and access level as undoing the original tool: a token that is malformed, no longer stored or not the account's own, or one this connection may not act on, is refused; with all=true such points are kept and counted in kept. Returns discarded (the count) and token, or all. Other users' undo points are never touched. Forwarded by AlphaBridge Connect to the one site this connection reaches.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
allNotrue discards all of the account's own undo points; token is then ignored.
tokenNoThe undo token to discard (undo_…), as wp_undo_list or the original result shows it. Needed unless all=true.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / all / description
      Previous value: -"Discard all of your undo points. Ignores \"token\"."New value: +"true discards all of the account's own undo points; token is then ignored."
    • changedInput schema / properties / token / description
      Previous value: -"The undo token to discard."New value: +"The undo token to discard (undo_…), as wp_undo_list or the original result shows it. Needed unless all=true."
  2. Added

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations (destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false), it discloses permanence and the irreversible consequence, the required permission parity with the original undo, refusal behavior for malformed/foreign/unstored tokens, that refused points survive and are counted in "kept" under all=true, and that other users' undo points are never touched. That is unusually rich behavioral context for a destructive tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The destructive core and its permanence are front-loaded and almost every clause carries information. It is a single dense, semicolon-chained block, though, so the permission and return-value material is harder to scan than it needs to be.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description still explains return values (discarded, token, all, kept), the authorization model, the multi-tenant isolation rule, and the AlphaBridge forwarding scope. Nothing an agent needs to call this correctly is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3, but the description adds meaning beyond the schema: all=true drops every one of the account's own points at once and causes foreign/refused points to be retained and counted rather than dropped. It adds no token-format detail beyond what the schema already documents.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource: "Throw away an undo point and its snapshot without restoring anything." The contrast with restoring distinguishes it from wp_undo, and the all=true variant is called out, so an agent can place it precisely among the undo family.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

"Meant for a change confirmed good" gives a concrete condition for choosing this over undoing, and the all=true clause covers the bulk case. It never names wp_undo or wp_undo_list as the alternative, so the routing is implied rather than explicit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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