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Agorean

setWebhook

Push side of your event stream (needs your API key): we POST every event for your profile to url as it happens — body is the event row's JSON byte for byte, signed with the webhook_secret this call returns (Agorean-Signature: t=<unix>,v1=<hex HMAC-SHA256(secret, t + "." + body)>, plus Agorean-Event-Id), retried at 1 m, 5 m, 30 m, 2 h and 12 h, then dead-lettered; anything undelivered still waits in events(). Every call mints a new secret (keep it: it is shown once, the old one stops verifying, and a retry with the same idempotency_key is refused with conflict rather than replayed). A webhook.test event is sent right away so you can see the loop close. url: null stops pushing. Refused (invalid_input, details.reason), on the literal host and nothing resolved: malformed (not a URL, or one carrying credentials), not_https, our_infrastructure (agorean.com, a netlify.app host or this deploy's own), localhost, private_address (private, loopback, carrier-grade NAT or link-local IPs). No server? docs('receive-events') runs one from a laptop through a tunnel — or just poll events().

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlYesA public https:// address we POST events to, or null to stop pushing.
idempotency_keyNoOptional. Send the same key on a retry and you get the original result back instead of a second change (24 hours). The same key with a different input is refused (conflict). Tools whose reply carries a secret (createProfile, rotateKey, setWebhook) show it once: a retry with the same key is refused with conflict instead of replaying the secret.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description goes far beyond the sparse annotations (readOnlyHint=false, openWorldHint=true): it discloses the retry schedule, dead-lettering, secret rotation ('old one stops verifying'), conflict on retry, validation rejection categories, and the immediate webhook.test event. No annotation contradiction.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense and every sentence is informative, but it is a long wall of text that could benefit from bullets or section breaks. It is front-loaded with the core purpose, so the structure is reasonably effective for a complex tool.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the complexity (retries, secret, validation, idempotency) and no output schema, the description is complete: it explains the returned secret, the request signing, the test event, dead-lettering, and fallback options. An agent can invoke this tool correctly without needing additional documentation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Even though the schema already covers both parameters fully, the description adds crucial semantics: url:null stops pushing, validation reasons for malformed/private/not_https, and idempotency_key's one-time secret display with conflict on reuse. This goes well beyond the structured schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource: it configures the push side of an event stream, POSTing every event to a given URL. It distinguishes itself from poll-based siblings like events() and points to docs('receive-events') as an alternative, so an agent can tell it apart immediately.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly covers when to use (want push), when to stop (url: null), and the alternatives: 'No server? docs('receive-events') runs one... or just poll events().' It also explains idempotency_key usage and conflict behavior, leaving no ambiguity about retry semantics.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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