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Verify zk circuit proof

affix_circuit_verify
Destructive

Verify an UltraHonk proof against its circuit. Success consumes the proof; repeat verification can fail as already spent. Accepts raw proof hex or a recent server proof reference. SDK-local HMAC proofs are not supported by this endpoint. Requires mcp:write.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bodyYesJSON request body for this check.
circuitIdYesPath segment `circuitId`.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed5 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / body / description
      Previous value: -"JSON request body. See the AffixIO OpenAPI schema resource for the contract."New value: +"JSON request body for this check."
    • addedInput schema / properties / body / properties
      Added value: +{
      +  "agentCredential": {},
      +  "agent_trust_credential": {},
      +  "credential": {},
      +  "proof": {
      +    "description": "Raw UltraHonk proof hex, proof_ref, digest, or recent server pf_ proof ID.",
      +    "minLength": 1,
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  "requestAttestation": {
      +    "type": "boolean"
      +  },
      +  "sector": {
      +    "type": "string"
      +  }
      +}
    • addedInput schema / properties / body / required
      Added value: +[
      +  "proof"
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / body / type
      Added value: +"object"
    • changedInput schema / required
      Previous value: -[
      -  "circuitId"
      -]New value: +[
      +  "circuitId",
      +  "body"
      +]
  2. First observed

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations declare destructive=true and idempotentHint=false, and the description makes that concrete: 'Success consumes the proof; repeat verification can fail as already spent.' It also discloses the auth scope and which proof sources are rejected — context an agent cannot get from the flags alone.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Five short sentences, zero filler, all front-loaded around the core action before the consumption caveat, the accepted formats, the exclusion and the auth requirement. Each sentence carries distinct information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, and the description never says what a verification yields (boolean, receipt, structured result) or what a failure looks like beyond 'already spent'. For a destructive tool with a nested body containing several undescribed credential fields, that leaves a real gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the description's proof-format sentence largely restates what the `proof` field already documents (hex, proof_ref, digest, pf_ ID). Nested body fields such as sector, credential, agentCredential and requestAttestation get no explanation in either place, but the schema baseline holds this at 3.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Specific verb and resource: 'Verify an UltraHonk proof against its circuit', which distinguishes it from affix_circuit_prove and the merkle/token verify siblings by proof type. It stops short of naming an alternative (e.g. affix_proof_ref_verify) it could be confused with, so an agent still has to infer the split.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives one useful exclusion ('SDK-local HMAC proofs are not supported by this endpoint') and an auth prerequisite ('Requires mcp:write'), but never states when to pick this over affix_proof_ref_verify or affix_verify. Usage is implied by proof format rather than declared.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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