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Remove Member

remove_member
DestructiveIdempotent

Remove a member from the workspace (the current one unless workspaceId names another) and revoke their API keys and connect links there. They stay in the organization and keep their other workspaces. You cannot remove yourself, and a member's last workspace cannot be removed (400): use remove_organization_member instead. Confirm with the user first, naming the member and the workspace. Needs the members.manage permission, which Admin holds. Fails with 404 when the user is not a member of this workspace. Returns { success: true }.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "userId": "<userId>"
    },
    "name": "remove_member"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
userIdYesThe member's userId from list_members
workspaceIdNoWorkspace to act in: an id from list_workspaces. Omit to act in the workspace list_workspaces marks current. Use the same workspaceId for every call about the same workspace, since ids from one workspace (accounts, posts, uploads) do not exist in another

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYesAn object with success: true once the member is removed from the workspace.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes well beyond the destructive/idempotent annotations by disclosing the blast radius (API keys and connect links in that workspace are revoked, but the user stays in the organization and keeps other workspaces), the permission gate, and the concrete failure modes (400 for last workspace, 404 for non-member).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the action and scope, then constraints, then errors, then return value. Dense but every clause carries operational information; no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Covers scope, side effects, permissions, exclusions, alternatives, and error codes, and a return value even though an output schema exists. Nothing needed to call this destructive tool safely is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so both parameters are already fully documented, including the workspaceId default and the cross-workspace id consistency rule. The description restates the default-workspace behavior and adds no syntax or format detail the schema lacks, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Remove a member from the workspace') and immediately scopes it ('the current one unless workspaceId names another'), which an agent can distinguish from remove_organization_member without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit routing to the alternative ('use remove_organization_member instead') for the last-workspace case, plus hard exclusions (cannot remove yourself), a confirmation protocol naming member and workspace, and the required permission. Nothing about when to use it is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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