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Able and Agent Sandbox

by com.ableandagent
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Answer in ACT chat

send_message
DestructiveIdempotent

Answer a Human in one conversation on any of your Principal's ACTs, as POST /api/v1/conversations/{id}/messages. The Human sees you as the Agent. Never put a door code in chat; it belongs in the access note.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
keyNoYour key, aak_…, when you cannot send it in the Authorization header. The sandbox only; on the live site the header alone is read.
bodyYesWhat to say.
conversationYesThe conversation's id, cnv_….
idempotencyKeyYesAny string, one per errand or message you mean to send once: a retry with the same one does it once, never twice.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed3 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / idempotencyKey / description
      Previous value: -"Any string, one per thing you mean to do once: a retry with the same one does it once."New value: +"Any string, one per errand or message you mean to send once: a retry with the same one does it once, never twice."
    • addedInput schema / properties / idempotencyKey / minLength
      Added value: +1
    • changedInput schema / required
      Previous value: -[
-  "conversation",
-  "body"
-]New value: +[
+  "conversation",
+  "body",
+  "idempotencyKey"
+]
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=false, destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, so the safety profile is carried by structured data. The description adds genuinely non-obvious behavior: the Human sees the agent as 'the Agent', and certain content (door codes) must never appear in chat — a disclosure rule no annotation conveys. It stops short of saying the send is irreversible or what happens on failure.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense and front-loaded: purpose and endpoint first, then the human-visible identity, then the secrecy rule. Every clause carries information, though embedding the raw HTTP path is a slightly unusual payload for a tool description.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive, idempotent write with no output schema, the description covers intent and content policy but says nothing about the result shape (e.g., a returned message id) or what a failure/duplicate-key collision looks like. Adequate to invoke, not complete enough to reason about outcomes.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, with conversation id, body, and idempotencyKey all documented in the schema, so the baseline is 3. The description reinforces the conversation scoping and the endpoint's {id} mapping but adds no format or syntax detail beyond that.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource (answer a Human in one conversation) and pins it to a concrete endpoint, POST /api/v1/conversations/{id}/messages. That immediately distinguishes it from the read-side sibling list_messages and makes the scope (one conversation, not broadcast) unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context for use — replying to a Human inside an existing conversation on one of the Principal's ACTs — plus a hard content rule ('Never put a door code in chat; it belongs in the access note'). It does not explicitly contrast with siblings or state when not to send, so it stays short of a 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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