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by com.aave.mcp
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Prepare enable/disable collateral

prepare_set_collateral
Read-only

Build an unsigned transaction to change whether a supplied asset is used as collateral (v3 or v4). On v4 'enable' sets the state; on v3 it toggles the current state, and a toggle that would invert a stated 'enable' is refused. The wallet must already hold a supply in that reserve: this sets a flag on it, nothing moves. Disabling can leave a position liquidatable, so it is simulated first: a health factor under 1 after is refused, just above 1 carries a warning to relay, and a build whose simulation could not run says so under 'warnings'. Enabling needs no check. Non-custodial.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
tokenNov3 only: underlying token address.
enableNov4: true to enable, false to disable (default true). v3 toggles the current state; send it on v3 as the intended end state, and a toggle that would produce the opposite is refused.
marketNov3 only: market pool address.
senderYesSender wallet address (0x, 40 hex): the wallet that will sign, as the user named it in this session. If no wallet has been named, ask for it; never substitute a placeholder, which is rejected.
chainIdNov3 only: chain id (positive integer).
versionNoOptional: inferred from the reserve selector ('reserveId' is v4, 'market'+'token'+'chainId' is v3). Send it to be explicit, or if you somehow set both.
reserveIdNov4 only: the opaque reserveId, copied verbatim from a get_markets row or a get_position_items item in this session (e.g. 'MTo6MHg5NGU3...Ojo1') - it cannot be constructed or recalled, so fetch one before the first call rather than after a refusal. For a withdraw or a repay take it from get_position_items for the position being acted on, not from get_markets: the same asset exists on several spokes, and the one this wallet supplied is the only one it can exit. The 'spokeId' from get_user_positions is NOT this: it is the same encoding one segment short, names the spoke rather than a reserve inside it, and is rejected. A token symbol such as 'USDC' is rejected too.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed4 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / reserveId / description
      Previous value: -"v4 only: the opaque reserveId, copied verbatim from a get_markets row or a get_position_items item in this session (e.g. 'MTo6MHg5NGU3...Ojo1') - it cannot be constructed or recalled, so fetch one before the first call rather than after a refusal. The 'spokeId' from get_user_positions is NOT this: it is the same encoding one segment short, names the spoke rather than a reserve inside it, and is rejected. A token symbol such as 'USDC' is rejected too."New value: +"v4 only: the opaque reserveId, copied verbatim from a get_markets row or a get_position_items item in this session (e.g. 'MTo6MHg5NGU3...Ojo1') - it cannot be constructed or recalled, so fetch one before the first call rather than after a refusal. For a withdraw or a repay take it from get_position_items for the position being acted on, not from get_markets: the same asset exists on several spokes, and the one this wallet supplied is the only one it can exit. The 'spokeId' from get_user_positions is NOT this: it is the same encoding one segment short, names the spoke rather than a reserve inside it, and is rejected. A token symbol such as 'USDC' is rejected too."
    • changedInput schema / properties / sender / description
      Previous value: -"Sender wallet address, 0x-prefixed (40 hex chars)."New value: +"Sender wallet address (0x, 40 hex): the wallet that will sign, as the user named it in this session. If no wallet has been named, ask for it; never substitute a placeholder, which is rejected."
    • changedInput schema / properties / version / description
      Previous value: -"Protocol version (v3 or v4; required, no 'all' for actions)."New value: +"Optional: inferred from the reserve selector ('reserveId' is v4, 'market'+'token'+'chainId' is v3). Send it to be explicit, or if you somehow set both."
    • changedInput schema / required
      Previous value: -[
-  "version",
-  "sender"
-]New value: +[
+  "sender"
+]
  2. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • removedInput schema / properties / reserve
      Removed value: -{
-  "description": "v4 only: the opaque reserveId, copied verbatim from a get_markets row or a get_position_items item in this session (e.g. 'MTo6MHg5NGU3...Ojo1') - it cannot be constructed or recalled, so fetch one before the first call rather than after a refusal. The 'spokeId' from get_user_positions is NOT this: it is the same encoding one segment short, names the spoke rather than a reserve inside it, and is rejected. A token symbol such as 'USDC' is rejected too.",
-  "type": "string"
-}
    • addedInput schema / properties / reserveId
      Added value: +{
+  "description": "v4 only: the opaque reserveId, copied verbatim from a get_markets row or a get_position_items item in this session (e.g. 'MTo6MHg5NGU3...Ojo1') - it cannot be constructed or recalled, so fetch one before the first call rather than after a refusal. The 'spokeId' from get_user_positions is NOT this: it is the same encoding one segment short, names the spoke rather than a reserve inside it, and is rejected. A token symbol such as 'USDC' is rejected too.",
+  "type": "string"
+}
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4.7/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Goes far beyond the readOnlyHint annotation by explaining the v3/v4 difference, toggle-refusal behavior, health-factor simulation with refusal/warning thresholds, and the fact that nothing moves. The description makes side effects and failure modes explicit.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core purpose, then the v3/v4 divergence, then constraints and simulation behavior. Dense but each sentence adds necessary information; no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Comprehensive for a complex tool: covers version behavior, preconditions, health-factor effects, refusal and warning semantics, and sender requirements. It doesn't enumerate the return shape beyond warnings, but that gap is acceptable without an output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters5/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Adds meaning beyond the schema: explains 'enable' means set-state on v4 but toggle on v3, that sender must be a named wallet, and how version and reserve selector are inferred. This compensates for ambiguous parameter names like 'enable'.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific operation (build an unsigned transaction to change collateral status) and immediately distinguishes v3 from v4 semanticsatio. It clearly tells an agent what the tool does and how it differs from sibling prepare_* tools.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Provides strong context: requires an existing supply in the reserve, explains that disabling is simulated firstholved, and notes non-custodial execution. It does not name a sibling tool as an explicit alternative, so it misses full exclusion guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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