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CVE Security Advisories (NVD High & Critical) — buy per-query in-session (cvewatch)

by com.a2awire
OverviewDiscussionsAdmin

data_session_open

Buy per-query access to live data listings - first taste free via data_preview. Listing: cvewatch: CVE Security Advisories (NVD, High & Critical) (0.01 USDC/query (max 20 queries/session)). Open a prepaid session, then fund and query.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
listing_idNoUUID of the listing. Provide exactly one of listing_slug or listing_id.
max_queriesNo
listing_slugNoPublic listing slug (from benchmarks_get / data_directory_get). Provide exactly one of listing_slug or listing_id.
open_tx_hashNo
buyer_addressNoBuyer EVM address. Optional: defaults to your own platform wallet when omitted.
proof_escrow_idNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed13 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / description
      Added value: +"MCP-only input for ``data_session_open``.\n\nSubclasses the REST ``DataSessionOpen`` payload without mutating it (the\n``FaucetUsdcDripInput`` approach) so the shared constraints\n(``max_queries`` bounds, ``open_tx_hash`` length, the EVM address check)\nstay declared once. Two friction-free relaxations, MCP surface only:\n\n* the listing may be named by its public slug OR its UUID (exactly one) -\n  the benchmark route and the purchase-gate 409 hand the agent a slug, and\n  demanding a UUID re-creates the slug-to-UUID lookup hop;\n* ``buyer_address`` is optional - when omitted the handler defaults to the\n  caller's own platform wallet (``WalletService.own_wallet_address``),\n  the same argument-filling default the USDC faucet uses.\n\nThe REST endpoint ``POST /api/v1/data-sessions`` keeps requiring\n``listing_id`` + ``buyer_address`` unchanged.\n\nThe ``type: ignore[assignment]`` marks are the intended pydantic override\n(narrowing the REST fields to Optional here); mypy reads that as an LSP\nviolation even though the model validator enforces exactly one listing\nreference and the handler guards the Optionals."
    • addedInput schema / properties / buyer_address / anyOf
      Added value: +[
+  {
+    "type": "string"
+  },
+  {
+    "type": "null"
+  }
+]
    • addedInput schema / properties / buyer_address / default
      Added value: +null
    • addedInput schema / properties / buyer_address / description
      Added value: +"Buyer EVM address. Optional: defaults to your own platform wallet when omitted."
    • removedInput schema / properties / buyer_address / type
      Removed value: -"string"
    • addedInput schema / properties / listing_id / anyOf
      Added value: +[
+  {
+    "format": "uuid",
+    "type": "string"
+  },
+  {
+    "type": "null"
+  }
+]
    • addedInput schema / properties / listing_id / default
      Added value: +null
    • addedInput schema / properties / listing_id / description
      Added value: +"UUID of the listing. Provide exactly one of listing_slug or listing_id."
    • removedInput schema / properties / listing_id / format
      Removed value: -"uuid"
    • removedInput schema / properties / listing_id / type
      Removed value: -"string"
    • addedInput schema / properties / listing_slug
      Added value: +{
+  "anyOf": [
+    {
+      "minLength": 1,
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    {
+      "type": "null"
+    }
+  ],
+  "default": null,
+  "description": "Public listing slug (from benchmarks_get / data_directory_get). Provide exactly one of listing_slug or listing_id.",
+  "title": "Listing Slug"
+}
    • removedInput schema / required
      Removed value: -[
-  "listing_id",
-  "buyer_address"
-]
    • changedInput schema / title
      Previous value: -"DataSessionOpen"New value: +"DataSessionOpenInput"
  2. First observed

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations provide no positive behavioral hints, so the description carries the disclosure burden. It adds useful context: the listing is paid at 0.01 USDC/query, sessions are capped at 20 queries, and funding/querying happens after opening. However, it does not disclose what opening a session does on-chain, whether a transaction hash is required, or what side effects or return values to expect.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three short sentences, front-loaded with the core purpose and free-preview alternative before the workflow. Every clause adds information: the paid nature, the free preview route, the specific listing, the per-query price, the session cap, and the subsequent funding/querying steps. There is no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness2/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a payment/session-opening tool with six optional parameters and no output schema, the description omits the role of open_tx_hash and proof_escrow_id, the expected response, and the exact relationship to data_session_fund and data_session_query. It also introduces a listing-level cap of 20 queries/session that creates ambiguity against the schema's max_queries maximum of 50, leaving the agent uncertain about valid input bounds.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Property descriptions cover listing_id, listing_slug, and buyer_address, but max_queries, open_tx_hash, and proof_escrow_id are left unexplained in both the schema and the tool description. The schema-level object description clarifies the exactly-one-listing rule and default wallet behavior, but the tool description does not help with the payment/escrow parameters, so an agent must guess their meaning.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly identifies the operation as opening a prepaid per-query data session, names the concrete listing (cvewatch), and contrasts it with the free data_preview path. This distinguishes it from downstream siblings like data_session_fund and data_session_query, though 'Buy per-query access' stops just short of explicitly saying this call creates the session.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives an explicit workflow: preview free with data_preview, open a prepaid session, then fund and query. This is sufficient to know the tool is the first step after previewing. It does not spell out when to choose data_session_attach_escrow or data_session_funding_package, so the main path is clear but not all alternatives are covered.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All CVE Security Advisories (NVD High & Critical) — buy per-query in-session (cvewatch) toolsInspect
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