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Revoke a credential

revoke_api_token
DestructiveIdempotent

Make one credential stop working immediately: whoever (or whatever app) holds it is refused on its next call. Use it when a credential leaked or a third-party app should no longer have access. This cannot be undone — there is no restore tool, and a replacement has to be created on the web console with a new secret. Confirm which credential with the user first by reading its name and prefix from list_api_tokens. You can only revoke what you can see: your own credentials, or every credential in the workspace if you are the owner; anything else reports not found. You can revoke the credential you are calling with (and the one it was derived from) — during a leak that is exactly the right move, but this connection ends with it, so tell the user before doing it. Revoking stops that one credential only: pages, links, reading records and other credentials are untouched.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
token_idYes要撤的那一枚的 token_id(从 list_api_tokens 来 —— 别处给不出)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, but the description adds substantially beyond them: irreversibility ('this cannot be undone'), the absence of a restore tool, the requirement to recreate via the web console with a new secret, the visible-scope rule (own credentials, or everything if workspace owner), and the self-revocation edge case where the calling connection dies.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the effect and the 'when to use' trigger, and every sentence carries actionable content (irreversibility, scope, self-revocation, blast radius). It runs long and slightly restates the single-credential scope in the opening and closing sentences, but there is no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter destructive tool with no output schema, the description covers everything an agent needs: effect, triggers, irreversibility, permission scope, error behavior ('reports not found'), and the self-revocation hazard. Nothing material is left to inference.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Only one parameter and schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents token_id and its provenance. The description reinforces the provenance ('which credential ... by reading its name and prefix from list_api_tokens'), which adds minor confirmation value but nothing the schema lacks.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a precise verb+resource ('make one credential stop working immediately') and clarifies the effect in operational terms ('refused on its next call'). It is clearly distinguishable from its revoke_* siblings (revoke_share_link, revoke_invite, revoke_versions) because it names the object as a credential/API token rather than a link or invite.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives explicit triggers ('when a credential leaked or a third-party app should no longer have access') and an explicit prerequisite workflow: read the name and prefix from list_api_tokens and confirm with the user first. It also states the permission boundary and what to do instead when the credential is out of scope ('anything else reports not found').

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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