Sign PDF

Get the signed PDF

download_signed_pdf

Read-only

After the status is "signed", get a private link where the user can open and download the signed PDF, with its signing certificate page, plus a command that downloads the file for tools that can run shell commands. Pass the request_token from send_for_signature. When Portant is connected with sign-in, the request_id alone also works for a signed copy Portant stores for the account (find it with find_signature_requests). Portant also emailed the signed PDF to the user.

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`request_id`	No	With sign-in, instead of request_token, for a signed copy Portant stores for the account.
`request_token`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed2 schema fields changedOct 18, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / request_id

Added value: +{
+  "description": "With sign-in, instead of request_token, for a signed copy Portant stores for the account.",
+  "type": "string"
+}

removedInput schema / required
```
Removed value: -[
-  "request_token"
-]
```

First observedOct 16, 2026

TDQS

A4.6/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, non-destructive, closed-world), and the description adds real behavior beyond them: the status prerequisite, that the link is private, that a shell-command variant is included, and that Portant also emailed the PDF. It stops short of stating link lifetime/expiry or what happens if the status is not yet signed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The essential precondition is front-loaded and every sentence carries information (precondition, credential source, alternate credential, delivery note). The first sentence is dense and stacks three deliverables, which slightly hurts scannability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, and the description fills that gap by describing the return value (private open/download link with certificate page, plus a shell download command) and the fallback stored copy. Prerequisites and both credential paths are covered, so an agent has what it needs to call it correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is only 50% (request_token has no schema description), so the description must compensate and does: it says request_token comes from send_for_signature and that request_id is the sign-in equivalent for an account-stored copy, matching the schema note on request_id. It does not say whether the two are mutually exclusive or which wins if both are passed.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('get a private link ... download the signed PDF') and specifies what is returned (link plus signing certificate page plus a shell command). It is clearly distinguishable from get_signature_status (which only reports status) and find_signature_requests (which locates the request).

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives an explicit precondition ('After the status is "signed"'), names where the credential comes from ('Pass the request_token from send_for_signature'), and names the alternative path plus the sibling to use for it ('request_id ... find it with find_signature_requests'). Both routing conditions are spelled out.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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