Grigora

delete_commerce_variant

Destructive

Remove one variant from a product and drop its stock counter.

The product's options are left in place, so the combination can be re-added later.

Args: project_id: The project ID. product_id: The product ID. variant_id: The variant ID to remove.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "project_id": "<project_id>",
      "product_id": "<product_id>",
      "variant_id": "<variant_id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_commerce_variant"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`product_id`	Yes
`project_id`	Yes
`variant_id`	Yes

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`result`	Yes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 15, 2026

TDQS

B3.4/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely useful side-effect detail beyond that: the stock counter is dropped but product options are preserved, which tells the agent what survives the deletion.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The behavioral note is front-loaded in the first two sentences and the Args list is short and scannable. The Args block is largely redundant given the schema, but it costs little space.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values needn't be described, and the key side effect (variant removed, stock counter dropped, options kept) is covered. However, for a destructive operation with 0% parameter coverage, there is no guidance on permissions, error conditions such as removing a last variant, or recovery.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and all three parameters are bare string fields. The Args block only restates the parameter names as 'The project ID', 'The product ID', and 'The variant ID to remove', adding no format, lookup, or dependency semantics to compensate for the coverage gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (remove) on a specific resource (one variant of a product) and clarifies the scope by noting the product's options survive. It implicitly separates itself from delete_commerce_product by targeting a single variant, though it doesn't name that sibling explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use statement, and no alternatives are named. The note that options are retained 'so the combination can be re-added later' implies a scenario (temporarily removing a variant) but leaves the agent to infer it.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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