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AINumbers Fintech Intelligence Suite

Securitization Risk Retention Check

check_securitization_risk_retention
Read-onlyIdempotent

Securitization Risk Retention Check: OpenChainGraph compute node (compliance_mandate). Deterministic OpenChainGraph compute node. By default (compute:"auto") inputs are computed server-side on Cloudflare Workers for gpu:false nodes with a registered kernel; compute:"browser" forces client-side execution and returns a browser delegation URL instead. gpu:true nodes always delegate to the browser. Inputs are processed transiently to compute the response and are not stored, logged, or retained. Use synthetic or anonymised inputs only. Exports an AP2 artifact with execution_hash for chain provenance. Open at: https://ainumbers.co/chaingraph/art-447-securitization-risk-retention-check.html FV-status (published/proven/still-trusted for this spec): /fv-status/8b5ae30d812cd234cfb6068c4ce2022f01d10f2a358979b0f0d73421e09d2543.json — a snapshot, not a subscription; this receipt verifies offline regardless of whether that file is ever fetched.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
computeNoCompute mode (v0.4 Compute Binding). "auto" (default) = server for gpu:false nodes with registered kernels; "server" = force server-side; "browser" = always return browser delegation URL. gpu:true nodes always delegate.
parent_hashesNoexecution_hash values from upstream ChainGraph AP2 artifacts to chain from (sets chain.parent_hashes in the export).
parent_tool_idsNotool_id values matching parent_hashes, in the same order.
policy_parametersNoInput parameters for this tool's decision function. For gpu:false nodes with a registered kernel, these are computed server-side when compute is "auto" or "server". See the tool's manifest for field names.

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The description extensively discloses behavioral traits beyond the annotations: it is deterministic, explains compute modes (auto/server/browser), states inputs are processed transiently and not stored/logged/retained, mentions the AP2 artifact export with execution_hash for chain provenance, and provides a URL and FV-status link. No contradiction with annotations (readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, etc.) is present. This is a model of transparency.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is ~250 words and dense with technical details (compute modes, data retention, artifact, FV-status). It front-loads the purpose and includes operational details, but it is verbose and could be tightened by moving less-critical boilerplate (e.g., FV-status explanation) to a secondary section. Structure is adequate but not optimally concise; every sentence carries information, but efficiency is moderate.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given the tool's complexity (compute modes, artifact export, provenance) and the absence of an output schema, the description covers most runtime behavior: compute execution contexts, data retention, artifact generation, and a verification link. However, it does not describe the actual return payload (e.g., whether the tool returns a boolean, a risk assessment, or just the artifact). This gap is significant for an agent that needs to interpret the result, though the artifact export likely implies the response contains the execution_hash and possibly computed values. Overall, it is nearly complete but lacks explicit output semantics.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The input schema has 100% coverage—every parameter (compute, parent_hashes, parent_tool_ids, policy_parameters) has a description. The description's text adds little beyond what the schema already states; for example, it references the manifest for policy_parameters field names. The description does not introduce new meaning or clarify parameter usage beyond the schema, so it meets the baseline for high schema coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool's purpose: a compliance check for securitization risk retention, within an OpenChainGraph compute node context. However, it does not explicitly differentiate this from the many sibling 'check_*' tools (e.g., check_conforming_loan_limit, check_credit_concentration_topn_sector), leaving the agent to infer uniqueness from the specific resource name. The verb 'check' and resource are present, but sibling differentiation is absent.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides some usage context: it is a compliance_mandate compute node, suggests using synthetic or anonymised inputs, and mentions compute modes. It also notes that gpu:true nodes always delegate to the browser. However, it does not specify when to choose this tool over alternative checks or provide exclusions (e.g., 'if you need X, use Y instead'). There is no guidance on selecting among sibling tools, so the agent must rely on the resource name to infer applicability.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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TDQS

C2.4/5.0
Disambiguation1/5

Nearly every tool is an 'OpenChainGraph compute node' with identical boilerplate, and dozens of assess/check/validate/verify/lint/recompute verbs overlap heavily in purpose. An agent cannot reliably tell which of many similarly scoped tools should handle a given compliance or analytics question.

Naming Consistency2/5

Most names are snake_case, so there is superficial consistency, but the verb vocabulary is enormous and unpredictable, mixing build/compute/check/validate/verify/lint/assess/classify/score/reconcile and more. Several noun-first names such as pain001_validate, recon_match, and ha_record_validate further break the pattern.

Tool Count1/5

695 tools is far beyond any practical agent-facing surface, exceeding even the extreme end of the calibration range. This is a full product catalog dumped into one MCP server rather than a curated, usable tool set.

Completeness3/5

The suite covers an extremely wide range of fintech and regulatory calculators, validators, chain tools, and discovery utilities, so coverage is broad rather than thin. However, the lack of a clear domain boundary makes completeness nearly impossible to assess, and the heavy overlap suggests the surface was generated rather than intentionally designed.