Agent Leverage

Update MCP server

update_mcp_server

Idempotent

Update an org-scoped MCP upstream server. Supplying authValue rotates the stored credential; omitting it leaves the existing one.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "update_mcp_server"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`id`	Yes
`url`	No	Streamable-HTTP endpoint of the upstream MCP server.
`name`	No	Unique per-org identifier for the server (1–50 chars).
`enabled`	No
`authType`	No
`authValue`	No	Plaintext upstream credential (bearer token or header value). Encrypted at rest; never returned.
`transport`	No
`headerName`	No	Header name for authType="header" (e.g. "X-Api-Key").
`description`	No
`displayName`	No
`selectedTools`	No	Allow-list of upstream tool names. null = all allowed, [] = none, [names] = only those.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedOct 1, 2026

TDQS

A3.5/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=false, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely new behavior: partial-update semantics for authValue (supplying it rotates the credential, omitting it preserves the existing one), which the agent cannot infer from annotations or schema alone.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two compact sentences, front-loaded with the operation and scope, with the credential-rotation nuance immediately following. No filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For an 11-parameter, no-output-schema mutation tool, the description covers the key credential behavior but leaves the other partial-update fields (enabled, authType, transport, etc.) and their interplay unexplained. Adequate but with clear gaps.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 45%, so several parameters (enabled, authType, transport, description, displayName) lack documentation in both schema and description. The description does add valuable omission semantics for authValue, but it does not compensate for the undocumented majority.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Update an org-scoped MCP upstream server'), which cleanly separates it from create_mcp_server, get_mcp_server, and delete_mcp_server by virtue of the verb. It does not explicitly name those siblings, but the scope qualifier 'org-scoped' adds precision beyond the bare name.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No guidance on when to update versus recreate, nor any prerequisites or notes about related tools like test_mcp_server_connection. Usage is only implied by the verb 'Update'.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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