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Delete security group rule

delete_security_group_rule
DestructiveIdempotent

Permanently removes one rule from a security group; machines with the group lose it at once. Ask the user first. When a machine gets a public URL, the platform opens that port to any address in every security group the machine has at that moment, and closes it when the URL is removed. A group attached later does not have it. Removing such a rule takes that URL offline, and removing the rule for port 22 ends SSH from outside. Get the rule id from list_security_groups (each group lists its rules).

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "delete_security_group_rule"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesThe rule to remove: an id from a group's rules in list_security_groups.

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idNo
modeNo
ruleNo
errorNo
statusNo
deletedNo
detailsNo
messageNo
recoveryNo
validationNo
security_group_idNo

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is known. The description goes well beyond that by disclosing immediacy ("machines with the group lose it at once"), the platform's automatic public-URL port opening behavior across all groups present at that moment, the fact that later-attached groups are unaffected, and concrete failure modes (URL goes offline, port 22 removal ends external SSH).

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core action and its immediate consequence are front-loaded, and the confirmation instruction comes early. The public-URL passage is the longest part but carries genuine hazard information rather than filler, though it could be tightened.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present and annotations covering the safety profile, the remaining burden is hazard disclosure and confirmation policy — both covered thoroughly. An agent has everything needed to call this correctly and to warn the user about SSH or URL loss.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100% and the schema's own id description already says it comes from a group's rules in list_security_groups, so the description's id-sourcing sentence largely repeats structured data. Baseline 3 applies; no additional format or validation meaning is added.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening clause states a specific verb and resource with precise scope: "Permanently removes one rule from a security group." That cleanly separates it from add_security_group_rule (adds a rule) and delete_security_group (removes the whole group) without needing to name them.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives an explicit precondition — "Ask the user first" — and tells the agent where to source the required id ("Get the rule id from list_security_groups"). It does not explicitly say when to prefer this over add_security_group_rule or delete_security_group, but the destructive framing makes the intended context clear.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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