List research articles
list_research_articlesOhey research articles, newest first: incident write-ups with timelines, code analysis and indicators.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| threat | No | Only articles about this technique or kit. |
list_research_articlesOhey research articles, newest first: incident write-ups with timelines, code analysis and indicators.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| threat | No | Only articles about this technique or kit. |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false, and openWorldHint=false, so the safety profile is covered by structured data. The description adds genuine value beyond that by disclosing sort order (newest first) and the shape of the content (timelines, code analysis, indicators). It omits result volume, pagination, and whether the list is bounded, which matter for a read-only list tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One sentence, front-loaded with the resource and ordering, with no wasted clauses. The garbled leading token 'Ohey' undermines clarity and makes the opening read as a typo rather than a deliberate statement.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple read-only list tool with one optional, fully documented parameter and no output schema, the description covers what the articles are and their ordering. It still leaves the agent without guidance on result size, pagination, or when to use this versus the threat-lookup siblings, which is a real gap even at this complexity level.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and the single optional 'threat' parameter is documented in the schema with its pattern. The description never mentions the filter, so it adds no meaning beyond the schema. Baseline 3 is appropriate when the schema carries the parameter documentation.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description identifies the resource (research articles), the ordering (newest first), and the content types (incident write-ups with timelines, code analysis, indicators), which lets an agent infer it is a listing tool. However, the opening word 'Ohey' is garbled and no clear verb is stated, so the purpose is implied by the name rather than declared. Sibling differentiation is incidental: none of the listed siblings return articles, but the description never says so.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no explicit when-to-use guidance, no exclusions, and no reference to alternatives such as get_threat or list_threats. 'Newest first' hints that this is a browse/recent-activity tool, but the agent must infer that. No prerequisites or filtering advice are given.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.