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Ohey research

Get a technique or kit

get_threat
Read-only

A technique or kit page's statistics: sites matched by month, how many sites were still infected when rescanned, WordPress and Joomla shares, common plugins and core versions, kits seen together on the same sites, its EtherHiding contracts, the hosts its ClickFix commands download from (the 20 on the most sites) and the articles about it.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
slugYesA slug from list_threats, such as clickfix, etherhiding or socgholish.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

C2.9/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint=false, so safety is covered and the description does not contradict them. The description's real contribution is disclosing the shape of the payload (monthly site counts, rescan infection counts, CMS shares, co-occurring kits, capped ClickFix host list of 20), which is valuable with no output schema. It says nothing about behavior for an unknown slug or whether results are cached/current.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

It is a single sentence, which is efficient, and the payload summary is front-loaded. However, the long comma-spliced list of return fields reads as a data dump and buries the odd parenthetical "(the 20 on the most sites)" mid-clause, making it harder to scan than a short purpose statement plus a structured field list.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, enumerating returned statistics is the right use of the description, and it covers the main data families an agent would need to judge relevance. What is missing is the usage contract: when to call it versus list_threats and the narrower search tools, and what happens on an invalid or unknown slug.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the slug parameter already documents its pattern and gives example values from list_threats. The description adds no meaning beyond the schema — it never mentions slug, allowed values, or case sensitivity — so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose3/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

"A technique or kit page's statistics" identifies the resource and the kind of data returned, but there is no verb and no explicit statement of what the tool does (fetch/retrieve a single threat profile by slug). It is distinguishable from list_threats only indirectly, since the enumerated return fields imply a single detailed record.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

No when-to-use guidance at all: nothing says to call this after list_threats to drill into one slug, and nothing points to get_etherhiding_contract, search_clickfix_commands, or list_research_articles as narrower alternatives even though the description mentions related data (EtherHiding contracts, ClickFix hosts, articles). The agent must infer routing from sibling names alone.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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