SBOM inventory plus real OSV.dev dependency-vulnerability matches and dependency-freshness signals for a public Git repository. One-shot alternative to a per-seat secret-scanning subscription.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| ref | No | Optional branch/tag to analyze. Defaults to the repository's default branch. | |
| repo_url | Yes | Public https://github.com/... or https://gitlab.com/... repository URL. |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the behavioral burden and does provide meaningful specifics: it reports real OSV.dev matches and freshness signals rather than mere placeholders. It does not disclose output format, potential external calls, or any limitations, but the core behavior is reasonably transparent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences with no filler; the substantive content is front-loaded. The second sentence is positioned as a value proposition rather than technical detail, but it is still brief and useful.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description gives a clear sense of what the tool analyzes and what signals it reports, which is helpful given the absence of an output schema. It does not explain the return structure or how the 'standard' tier differs from sibling risk-report tools, leaving some context gaps.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so both repo_url and ref are already described in the input schema. The description adds limited extra parameter context beyond emphasizing that the repository must be public.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states that the tool produces an SBOM inventory, OSV.dev dependency-vulnerability matches, and dependency-freshness signals for a public Git repository. This makes the resource and content unmistakable, though it does not explicitly distinguish this tool from the sibling risk-report variants.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives useful context by positioning the tool as a one-shot alternative to a secret-scanning subscription, implying a single-use, public-repo scenario. However, it does not state when to choose this 'standard' report over the 'deep' or 'due_diligence' sibling tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Multiple tools occupy the same security-audit space: get_dns_lookup/get_domain_intelligence, get_security_posture/get_web_audit/post_domain_due_diligence, and the three post_security_repo_risk_report variants heavily overlap. Video generation is split only by duration, and get_ssl_check/get_security_posture both target TLS/certificate concerns, so an agent could easily select the wrong tool.
All tools use snake_case and a get_/ post_ prefix, which is a recognizable convention and generally readable. However, the suffix order is inconsistent (get_url_parse vs get_security_posture vs post_security_repo_risk_repport_standard), and get/post are HTTP-style prefixes rather than semantic verbs, so the pattern is only partially coherent.
34 tools is well above the 'too many' threshold and spans unrelated domains: domain security, repo risk, JSON/hash/text utilities, media generation, Quebec invoices, and x402 payments. Many tools are variants that could be consolidated (video durations, risk report tiers, audit scopes), so the count feels inflated rather than purposeful.
The set lacks a single apparent domain, so no complete lifecycle is clearly covered: video generation has no status/retrieval, repo risk reporting is read-only, and common companions (URL encoding, current timestamp, image analysis) are missing. It is a broad collection of one-off utilities rather than a coherent functional surface.