post_domain_due_diligence
Perform a comprehensive non-intrusive public-domain assessment covering DNS, mail security, TLS and HTTPS security headers.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | Yes | Public domain name to assess |
Perform a comprehensive non-intrusive public-domain assessment covering DNS, mail security, TLS and HTTPS security headers.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | Yes | Public domain name to assess |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must carry behavioral disclosure. It discloses that the assessment is 'non-intrusive' and limited to 'public-domain' data, which is useful safety context. However, it does not explain output format, whether live queries are performed, or any operational constraints.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
One sentence that opens with the core action and qualifiers, then lists scope. Every phrase earns its place, with no filler or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the one-parameter schema and 100% coverage, invocation is straightforward, but the absence of an output schema and any sibling comparison leaves the agent without information about the result shape or tool selection context. The description is adequate but not fully complete for a tool with overlapping siblings.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The single 'domain' parameter is fully documented in the schema (including an example), and schema description coverage is 100%. The description only restates the domain concept without adding format, normalization, or edge-case semantics.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Perform') and a clear resource ('public-domain assessment'), then enumerates the coverage areas (DNS, mail security, TLS, HTTPS security headers). This distinguishes it from narrower sibling tools like get_dns_lookup or get_security_headers by signaling a comprehensive aggregate scope.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the tool is for broad due-diligence assessments rather than single checks, but it never states when to choose it over get_dns_lookup, get_ssl_check, or get_security_headers. There are no exclusions or alternative recommendations, so the guidance remains implicit.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Multiple tools occupy the same security-audit space: get_dns_lookup/get_domain_intelligence, get_security_posture/get_web_audit/post_domain_due_diligence, and the three post_security_repo_risk_report variants heavily overlap. Video generation is split only by duration, and get_ssl_check/get_security_posture both target TLS/certificate concerns, so an agent could easily select the wrong tool.
All tools use snake_case and a get_/ post_ prefix, which is a recognizable convention and generally readable. However, the suffix order is inconsistent (get_url_parse vs get_security_posture vs post_security_repo_risk_repport_standard), and get/post are HTTP-style prefixes rather than semantic verbs, so the pattern is only partially coherent.
34 tools is well above the 'too many' threshold and spans unrelated domains: domain security, repo risk, JSON/hash/text utilities, media generation, Quebec invoices, and x402 payments. Many tools are variants that could be consolidated (video durations, risk report tiers, audit scopes), so the count feels inflated rather than purposeful.
The set lacks a single apparent domain, so no complete lifecycle is clearly covered: video generation has no status/retrieval, repo risk reporting is read-only, and common companions (URL encoding, current timestamp, image analysis) are missing. It is a broad collection of one-off utilities rather than a coherent functional surface.