get_web_audit
Consolidated DNS, TLS and HTTP security audit for a public HTTPS website.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | Yes |
Consolidated DNS, TLS and HTTP security audit for a public HTTPS website.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | Yes |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It states the audit scope but does not describe what the tool returns, whether it makes live network requests, whether URL normalization or validation occurs, or any side effects or limitations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, compact sentence with no filler. The key scoping terms 'Consolidated' and 'DNS, TLS and HTTP' are front-loaded, and every word adds value.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema and no annotations, the description is too thin to be fully actionable. It omits return format, failure behavior, request expectations, and how it differs operationally from sibling security tools, leaving an agent to guess at important invocation context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema only names the url property with no description, so the description's 'public HTTPS website' provides meaningful semantic guidance for the parameter. It tells an agent the target must be a publicly reachable HTTPS site, though it stops short of specifying URL format or examples.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description identifies a specific verb and resource: a consolidated DNS, TLS, and HTTP security audit. It clearly scopes the tool to public HTTPS websites and distinguishes it from narrower siblings like get_dns_lookup, get_ssl_check, and get_security_headers through the word 'Consolidated'.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no explicit guidance on when to use this tool versus the individual sibling tools. The word 'Consolidated' implies it is the comprehensive alternative, but no when-to-use, exclusion, or alternative routing is stated.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Multiple tools occupy the same security-audit space: get_dns_lookup/get_domain_intelligence, get_security_posture/get_web_audit/post_domain_due_diligence, and the three post_security_repo_risk_report variants heavily overlap. Video generation is split only by duration, and get_ssl_check/get_security_posture both target TLS/certificate concerns, so an agent could easily select the wrong tool.
All tools use snake_case and a get_/ post_ prefix, which is a recognizable convention and generally readable. However, the suffix order is inconsistent (get_url_parse vs get_security_posture vs post_security_repo_risk_repport_standard), and get/post are HTTP-style prefixes rather than semantic verbs, so the pattern is only partially coherent.
34 tools is well above the 'too many' threshold and spans unrelated domains: domain security, repo risk, JSON/hash/text utilities, media generation, Quebec invoices, and x402 payments. Many tools are variants that could be consolidated (video durations, risk report tiers, audit scopes), so the count feels inflated rather than purposeful.
The set lacks a single apparent domain, so no complete lifecycle is clearly covered: video generation has no status/retrieval, repo risk reporting is read-only, and common companions (URL encoding, current timestamp, image analysis) are missing. It is a broad collection of one-off utilities rather than a coherent functional surface.