get_security_posture
Assess TLS and HTTP security posture for a public HTTPS website.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | Yes |
Assess TLS and HTTP security posture for a public HTTPS website.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| url | Yes |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. 'Assess' implies a read-only inspection rather than a mutation, and 'public HTTPS website' suggests the target should be externally reachable, which weakly implies no authentication is needed. However, it does not describe output format, failure behavior, or other side effects.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single front-loaded sentence with no wasted words. It states the action, scope, and target clearly and efficiently.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple one-parameter read-style tool, the description conveys the essential purpose and target, but it is still somewhat incomplete given the absence of annotations and an output schema. It lacks guidance on return values, output structure, and how it differs from neighboring security tools.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has 0% description coverage for the single 'url' parameter, but the description compensates somewhat by indicating the URL should point to a public HTTPS website. It does not specify URL format details such as whether the scheme must be included, whether paths are allowed, or how redirects are handled.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Assess') and names the resource ('TLS and HTTP security posture') plus the target ('public HTTPS website'), so the core purpose is clear. It does not explicitly differentiate itself from overlapping siblings like get_security_headers or get_ssl_check, though 'security posture' suggests a broader assessment.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives no explicit guidance about when to choose this tool over alternatives such as get_security_headers, get_ssl_check, or get_web_audit. The intended use is only implied by the purpose, and no exclusions or comparative context are provided.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
Multiple tools occupy the same security-audit space: get_dns_lookup/get_domain_intelligence, get_security_posture/get_web_audit/post_domain_due_diligence, and the three post_security_repo_risk_report variants heavily overlap. Video generation is split only by duration, and get_ssl_check/get_security_posture both target TLS/certificate concerns, so an agent could easily select the wrong tool.
All tools use snake_case and a get_/ post_ prefix, which is a recognizable convention and generally readable. However, the suffix order is inconsistent (get_url_parse vs get_security_posture vs post_security_repo_risk_repport_standard), and get/post are HTTP-style prefixes rather than semantic verbs, so the pattern is only partially coherent.
34 tools is well above the 'too many' threshold and spans unrelated domains: domain security, repo risk, JSON/hash/text utilities, media generation, Quebec invoices, and x402 payments. Many tools are variants that could be consolidated (video durations, risk report tiers, audit scopes), so the count feels inflated rather than purposeful.
The set lacks a single apparent domain, so no complete lifecycle is clearly covered: video generation has no status/retrieval, repo risk reporting is read-only, and common companions (URL encoding, current timestamp, image analysis) are missing. It is a broad collection of one-off utilities rather than a coherent functional surface.