Delete LoS proposed target
delete_los_proposed_targetDelete a LoS proposed target by ID. Requires los_proposed_targets:write scope.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | LoS proposed target ID |
delete_los_proposed_targetDelete a LoS proposed target by ID. Requires los_proposed_targets:write scope.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | LoS proposed target ID |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -falseInput schema / properties / id / patternAdded value: +"^([0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12})$"Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"New value: +"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"Input schema / additionalPropertiesAdded value: +falseInput schema / properties / id / patternRemoved value: -"^([0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12})$"Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -falseInput schema / properties / id / patternAdded value: +"^([0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12})$"Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and idempotentHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description does add one genuine behavioral fact beyond the annotations, the required los_proposed_targets:write scope, but says nothing about side effects, dependent records, or irreversibility of the deletion.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, the core action front-loaded, and the scope requirement placed second. No filler or redundancy.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a single-parameter delete whose annotations carry the safety profile and whose schema carries the parameter, the description is nearly sufficient. The one gap is the effect of deletion (what is removed or whether related targets are affected), which is left unstated.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Only one parameter and schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents the UUID id fully. The description's 'by ID' adds no format or constraint detail beyond what the schema provides, matching the baseline for fully-covered schemas.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (Delete) and resource (LoS proposed target) plus the keying mechanism (by ID). An agent can distinguish it from the many delete_* siblings by the resource noun, though it does not name any specific sibling for differentiation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives an implied precondition (requires los_proposed_targets:write scope) but never states when to use this versus update_los_proposed_target or the bulk alternatives, nor any exclusions. Usage is largely inferred from the name.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.