Delete asset replacement plan
delete_asset_replacement_planDelete an asset replacement plan by ID. Requires asset_replacement_plans:write scope.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | Asset replacement plan ID |
delete_asset_replacement_planDelete an asset replacement plan by ID. Requires asset_replacement_plans:write scope.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | Asset replacement plan ID |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -falseInput schema / properties / id / patternAdded value: +"^([0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12})$"Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"New value: +"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"Input schema / additionalPropertiesAdded value: +falseInput schema / properties / id / patternRemoved value: -"^([0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12})$"Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -falseInput schema / properties / id / patternAdded value: +"^([0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12})$"Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the risk profile is covered. The description does add real value beyond the schema by naming the required scope (asset_replacement_plans:write), but it says nothing about permanence of deletion or side effects on linked records.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, deletion action front-loaded, permission requirement second. Nothing is padded or redundant.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a single-parameter destructive tool with no output schema the essentials (action, key, scope) are present, and annotations cover the destructive/idempotent profile. Still missing is whether the delete is permanent or recoverable, which an agent should know before calling.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
One parameter with 100% schema description coverage (UUID with an explicit pattern), so the schema already carries the semantics. The description only restates 'by ID' and adds no format or constraint detail beyond the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb (delete) and resource (asset replacement plan) plus the lookup key (by ID), which separates it from the create_/update_/get_/list_ siblings for the same resource. It doesn't call out the nearest alternatives explicitly, but the verb+resource pairing is unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance on when to delete versus archiving or updating a plan, no prerequisites beyond the scope, and no warning that the operation is irreversible. The agent must infer usage from the verb alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.