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Send the reviewed request

submit_referral_request
Idempotent

Send the request exactly as reviewed. CONSEQUENTIAL: call only after showing the customer the review from prepare_referral_request and getting their explicit permission. Pass that review token and privacy version with customerAuthorized:true. Repeating the same token never creates a second request.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "reviewToken": "<reviewToken>",
      "privacyVersion": "<privacyVersion>",
      "customerAuthorized": "<customerAuthorized>"
    },
    "name": "submit_referral_request"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
reviewTokenYes
privacyVersionYes
customerAuthorizedYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.3/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

The annotations already declare a non-read-only, open-world, idempotent, non-destructive write. The description adds genuine context beyond them: that this is CONSEQUENTIAL, that it requires human authorization, and that idempotency is token-scoped ('repeating the same token never creates a second request'), which is more specific than a bare idempotentHint. It stops short of describing failure modes or what a successful submission returns.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four tight sentences, front-loaded with the consequence warning and the precondition, then the call mechanics and idempotency note. No filler, though the 'CONSEQUENTIAL' capitalization is doing some of the work that a clearer hazard statement could do.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a consequential three-parameter mutation with no output schema, the definition covers the critical decision inputs: authorization, the review token, and duplicate-submission behavior. The gaps are the unexplained privacyVersion and the absence of any note on what failure or partial submission looks like.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description has to carry all three parameters. It explains reviewToken's origin (the review from prepare_referral_request) and that customerAuthorized must be true, but privacyVersion is only named, never explained — where it comes from or what it controls is left unstated.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Send the request') and constrains it with 'exactly as reviewed,' which ties it directly to the artifact produced by prepare_referral_request. An agent can distinguish this from prepare_referral_request and get_referral_options without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit precondition chain: only after showing the customer the review from prepare_referral_request and obtaining explicit permission. It names the upstream sibling and the gating condition, leaving nothing to inference about when this should fire.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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