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Assinafy MCP Server

Update signer

assinafy_update_signer
Destructive

Update a signer's information. Only supplied fields change; send null or an empty string to clear email or whatsapp_phone_number.

Verification integrity: email / whatsapp_phone_number cannot be changed while the signer has verified that channel on an in-flight (not yet certificated) document — the response is 400 naming the offending document(s). Already-certificated documents do not block updates. Changing a channel that has unverified in-flight requests rotates their access/verification codes (invalidating previously sent links/OTPs); use the resend endpoint to redeliver. full_name can always be updated.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
emailNoA valid email address, or null/empty to clear it.
full_nameNo
signer_idYesThe signer ID.
account_idNoAuthorized workspace; discovered from OAuth when omitted.
whatsapp_phone_numberNoE.164 and normalized on save; null/empty clears it.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / anyOf
      Previous value: -[
      -  {
      -    "required": [
      -      "full_name"
      -    ]
      -  },
      -  {
      -    "required": [
      -      "email"
      -    ]
      -  },
      -  {
      -    "required": [
      -      "whatsapp_phone_number"
      -    ]
      -  },
      -  {
      -    "required": [
      -      "government_id"
      -    ]
      -  }
      -]New value: +[
      +  {
      +    "required": [
      +      "full_name"
      +    ]
      +  },
      +  {
      +    "required": [
      +      "email"
      +    ]
      +  },
      +  {
      +    "required": [
      +      "whatsapp_phone_number"
      +    ]
      +  }
      +]
    • removedInput schema / properties / government_id
      Removed value: -{
      -  "description": "Signer's CPF (11 digits) or CNPJ (14 characters; may be alphanumeric). Formatting is accepted and the value is normalized on save. Required before the signer can use a verification method that identifies them by CPF. Null/empty clears it.",
      -  "type": [
      -    "string",
      -    "null"
      -  ]
      -}
  2. Changed8 schema fields changed
    • addedInput schema / properties / email / anyOf
      Added value: +[
      +  {
      +    "format": "email",
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  {
      +    "maxLength": 0,
      +    "type": "string"
      +  },
      +  {
      +    "type": "null"
      +  }
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / email / description
      Added value: +"A valid email address, or null/empty to clear it."
    • removedInput schema / properties / email / format
      Removed value: -"email"
    • removedInput schema / properties / email / type
      Removed value: -"string"
    • changedInput schema / properties / government_id / description
      Previous value: -"Signer's CPF (11 digits) or CNPJ (14 characters; may be alphanumeric). Formatting is accepted and the value is normalized on save. Required before the signer can use a verification method that identifies them by CPF."New value: +"Signer's CPF (11 digits) or CNPJ (14 characters; may be alphanumeric). Formatting is accepted and the value is normalized on save. Required before the signer can use a verification method that identifies them by CPF. Null/empty clears it."
    • changedInput schema / properties / government_id / type
      Previous value: -"string"New value: +[
      +  "string",
      +  "null"
      +]
    • changedInput schema / properties / whatsapp_phone_number / description
      Previous value: -"E.164; normalized on save."New value: +"E.164 and normalized on save; null/empty clears it."
    • changedInput schema / properties / whatsapp_phone_number / type
      Previous value: -"string"New value: +[
      +  "string",
      +  "null"
      +]
  3. Changed2 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / anyOf
      Previous value: -[
      -  {
      -    "required": [
      -      "full_name"
      -    ]
      -  },
      -  {
      -    "required": [
      -      "email"
      -    ]
      -  },
      -  {
      -    "required": [
      -      "whatsapp_phone_number"
      -    ]
      -  }
      -]New value: +[
      +  {
      +    "required": [
      +      "full_name"
      +    ]
      +  },
      +  {
      +    "required": [
      +      "email"
      +    ]
      +  },
      +  {
      +    "required": [
      +      "whatsapp_phone_number"
      +    ]
      +  },
      +  {
      +    "required": [
      +      "government_id"
      +    ]
      +  }
      +]
    • addedInput schema / properties / government_id
      Added value: +{
      +  "description": "Signer's CPF (11 digits) or CNPJ (14 characters; may be alphanumeric). Formatting is accepted and the value is normalized on save. Required before the signer can use a verification method that identifies them by CPF.",
      +  "type": "string"
      +}
  4. Added
  5. Removed
  6. Added

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only flag destructive/non-idempotent/not-read-only; the description goes well beyond by disclosing the side effect that matters most — rotating access/verification codes and invalidating previously sent links/OTPs. It also documents the failure mode (400 naming offending documents) and the exact scope of the 'verified on in-flight document' restriction, which annotations cannot express.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loads the core patch/clear semantics, then uses a bolded heading to separate the verification-integrity caveats. Dense but every sentence carries operational information; the only minor cost is the long em-dash clause about code rotation, which is justified by its importance.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 5-parameter mutation with no output schema, the description covers the write semantics, the clearing convention, the error case, and the side effects — enough to call it correctly. It stops short of describing a success response shape, which matters slightly more here given there is no output schema.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is already 80%, and the description adds real meaning on top: null/empty as an explicit clear signal for email and whatsapp_phone_number, and the rule that full_name can always be updated. It doesn't restate that whatsapp_phone_number is normalized to E.164, but that is already covered in the schema.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Update a signer's information') and immediately narrows the scope with 'Only supplied fields change', which distinguishes a partial patch from a full replacement. An agent can tell this apart from create/get signer siblings without inspecting the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives concrete when-not conditions (verified channel on an in-flight document → 400; already-certificated documents don't block) and names an alternative action for redelivery via the resend endpoint. What's missing is any explicit guidance on inspecting the signer first (e.g., via get/list signers) or when to prefer create over update, though those are largely self-evident from the verb.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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