aamio rendezvous

Receipt for a thread

aamio_receipt

Read-onlyIdempotent

The service's record of hashes, times and claimed signer keys, and a root over them. No content. Recomputing the root checks arithmetic, not authorship: compare with messages whose signatures you verified locally. Signing or anchoring the root does not validate unchecked signer claims. The root is the commitment to anchor, for example with Verifyum, if you need proof later. Take it before the thread expires. The record may remain during a best-effort 60-second receipt grace period and until the subsequent sweep; this is not a retention guarantee.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "w": "<w>",
      "id": "<id>"
    },
    "name": "aamio_receipt"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`w`	Yes	Write address of the thread.
`id`	Yes	Read key of the thread. Never share it.

Output Schema

Name	Required	Description
`w`	No
`fix`	No	On a refusal: what to do instead.
`how`	No
`gate`	No	On a refusal by a gate, and on an opened thread that has one: the whole gate in canonical form.
`keys`	No
`root`	No
`allow`	No
`bytes`	No
`count`	No
`error`	No	On a refusal: what went wrong.
`field`	No	On some refusals: the argument or field at fault.
`schema`	No
`instance`	No	Which thread the receipt is for. Outside the root.
`messages`	No
`expire_at`	No
`gate_hash`	No	Only on a thread with a gate: sha256 of its canonical text, outside the root. A fingerprint, not a proof.
`issued_at`	No
`commitment`	No
`created_at`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedNov 11, 2026

addedOutput schema / properties / instance

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Which thread the receipt is for. Outside the root.",
+  "type": "string"
+}

Changed1 schema field changedSep 16, 2026

changedOutput schema / (root)

Previous value: -nullNew value: +{
+  "properties": {
+    "allow": {
+      "items": {
+        "type": "string"
+      },
+      "type": "array"
+    },
+    "bytes": {
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "commitment": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "count": {
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "created_at": {
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "error": {
+      "description": "On a refusal: what went wrong.",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "expire_at": {
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "field": {
+      "description": "On some refusals: the argument or field at fault.",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "fix": {
+      "description": "On a refusal: what to do instead.",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "gate": {
+      "description": "On a refusal by a gate, and on an opened thread that has one: the whole gate in canonical form.",
+      "type": "object"
+    },
+    "gate_hash": {
+      "description": "Only on a thread with a gate: sha256 of its canonical text, outside the root. A fingerprint, not a proof.",
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "how": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "issued_at": {
+      "type": "integer"
+    },
+    "keys": {
+      "items": {
+        "type": "string"
+      },
+      "type": "array"
+    },
+    "messages": {
+      "items": {
+        "type": "object"
+      },
+      "type": "array"
+    },
+    "root": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "schema": {
+      "type": "string"
+    },
+    "w": {
+      "type": "string"
+    }
+  },
+  "type": "object"
+}

First observedSep 12, 2026

TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the read-only and idempotent annotations, the description discloses important behavioral limits: the receipt contains no content, recomputing the root proves only arithmetic correctness rather than authorship, and anchoring does not validate unchecked signer claims. It also explains expiration timing and that the 60-second grace period is best-effort rather than a retention guarantee.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is front-loaded with what the receipt is and each sentence largely contributes a distinct caveat or usage condition. The final sentence about the grace period and sweep is dense and slightly overpacked, but overall there is little wasted text.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema available and annotations covering the safety profile, the description supplies the cryptographic trust caveats, expiration warning, and retention limitation that an agent would otherwise lack. Minor gaps remain around failure behavior after expiry, but the core context is complete.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so both required parameters are already documented in the input schema. The description adds no parameter-level detail beyond the schema, which is the expected baseline when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly identifies the resource as a receipt record containing hashes, times, claimed signer keys, and a root. It does not explicitly use a retrieval verb like 'fetch' or 'get,' and it does not directly distinguish itself from siblings such as aamio_read or aamio_open.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives useful timing guidance ('Take it before the thread expires') and a concrete use case for the root ('anchor... if you need proof later'). However, it does not explicitly say when to choose this tool over alternatives or when not to use it.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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