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zkproofport-ai

by app.zkproofport.ai
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prove

Get the REST endpoint for long-running Noir proof generation. This hosted tool redirects; it does not generate a proof inside the MCP call. POST https://ai.zkproofport.app/api/v1/prove POST with {circuit} → 402 challenge with live accepts → sign the selected payment offer → retry with circuit-specific inputs and PAYMENT-SIGNATURE; include X-Payment-Nonce when supplied. Encrypt inputs only when the challenge supplies teePublicKey. Legacy X-Payment-TX requires X-Payment-Nonce. Action binding is optional for giwa_attestation: send both domain_separator and action_hash for a signed EIP-712 action, or omit both for an identity-only proof. Other circuits do not support actions. This deployment provides no hardware TEE attestation. HTTPS protects transport, but the prover receives proof inputs. Read the canonical guide before preparing inputs:

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
inputsYesCircuit-specific prepared witness. OIDC uses jwt, jwks, scope and provider; attestation circuits use their own wallet/attestation fields. Read get_guide.
circuitYesCanonical circuit id or supported alias. Read get_guide for the circuit-specific witness and verification chain.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed1 schema field changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / circuit / enum
      Previous value: -[
-  "coinbase_attestation",
-  "coinbase_country_attestation",
-  "oidc_domain_attestation",
-  "arc_eligibility",
-  "giwa_attestation",
-  "coinbase_kyc",
-  "coinbase_country",
-  "oidc_domain"
-]New value: +[
+  "coinbase_attestation",
+  "coinbase_country_attestation",
+  "oidc_domain_attestation",
+  "giwa_attestation",
+  "coinbase_kyc",
+  "coinbase_country",
+  "oidc_domain"
+]
  2. Changed6 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / circuit / description
      Previous value: -"Which circuit to use."New value: +"Canonical circuit id or supported alias. Read get_guide for the circuit-specific witness and verification chain."
    • changedInput schema / properties / circuit / enum
      Previous value: -[
-  "coinbase_kyc",
-  "coinbase_country"
-]New value: +[
+  "coinbase_attestation",
+  "coinbase_country_attestation",
+  "oidc_domain_attestation",
+  "arc_eligibility",
+  "giwa_attestation",
+  "coinbase_kyc",
+  "coinbase_country",
+  "oidc_domain"
+]
    • changedInput schema / properties / inputs / additionalProperties
      Previous value: -falseNew value: +{}
    • changedInput schema / properties / inputs / description
      Previous value: -"All circuit inputs required to generate the ZK proof."New value: +"Circuit-specific prepared witness. OIDC uses jwt, jwks, scope and provider; attestation circuits use their own wallet/attestation fields. Read get_guide."
    • removedInput schema / properties / inputs / properties
      Removed value: -{
-  "coinbase_attester_pubkey_x": {
-    "description": "32-byte secp256k1 X coordinate of Coinbase attester public key (0x-prefixed).",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "coinbase_attester_pubkey_y": {
-    "description": "32-byte secp256k1 Y coordinate of Coinbase attester public key (0x-prefixed).",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "country_list": {
-    "description": "ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country codes. Only for coinbase_country circuit.",
-    "items": {
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "type": "array"
-  },
-  "depth": {
-    "description": "Number of levels in the Merkle tree. With 4 signers, depth = 2.",
-    "type": "number"
-  },
-  "is_included": {
-    "description": "true = prove country IS in list, false = prove it is NOT. Only for coinbase_country circuit.",
-    "type": "boolean"
-  },
-  "leaf_index": {
-    "description": "0-based index of the coinbase attester in the authorized signers array.",
-    "type": "number"
-  },
-  "merkle_proof": {
-    "description": "Array of 32-byte sibling hashes (0x-prefixed) in the Merkle tree, from leaf level to root.",
-    "items": {
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "type": "array"
-  },
-  "merkle_root": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed 32-byte Merkle root of authorized attesters tree",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "nullifier": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed 32-byte nullifier: privacy-preserving unique identifier",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "raw_transaction": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed RLP-encoded EAS attestation transaction bytes from Base chain.",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "scope_bytes": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed 32-byte keccak256 of the scope string",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "signal_hash": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed 32-byte signal hash: keccak256(abi.encodePacked(address, scope, circuitId))",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "signature": {
-    "description": "65-byte eth_sign signature (0x-prefixed hex, 134 chars). Sign signal_hash with the KYC wallet using eth_sign.",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "tx_length": {
-    "description": "Actual byte length of raw_transaction before server zero-pads to 300 bytes.",
-    "type": "number"
-  },
-  "user_address": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed 20-byte wallet address with Coinbase attestation",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "user_pubkey_x": {
-    "description": "32-byte secp256k1 public key X coordinate (0x-prefixed hex). Recovered via ecrecover(signal_hash, signature).",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "user_pubkey_y": {
-    "description": "32-byte secp256k1 public key Y coordinate (0x-prefixed hex). Recovered via ecrecover(signal_hash, signature).",
-    "type": "string"
-  }
-}
    • removedInput schema / properties / inputs / required
      Removed value: -[
-  "signal_hash",
-  "nullifier",
-  "scope_bytes",
-  "merkle_root",
-  "user_address",
-  "signature",
-  "user_pubkey_x",
-  "user_pubkey_y",
-  "raw_transaction",
-  "tx_length",
-  "coinbase_attester_pubkey_x",
-  "coinbase_attester_pubkey_y",
-  "merkle_proof",
-  "leaf_index",
-  "depth"
-]
  3. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so impressively: it discloses the redirect (not in-call generation), the 402 payment challenge handshake, the X-Payment-Nonce requirement for legacy X-Payment-TX, conditional input encryption only when teePublicKey is present, and the absence of hardware TEE attestation with a warning that the prover sees inputs. These are exactly the behavioral traits an agent cannot infer from the schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Dense and long, but front-loaded with the essential fact (endpoint retrieval, not in-call proving) and every subsequent sentence conveys protocol-critical information: payment handshake, encryption condition, action binding, security caveat, and per-circuit guide links. Nothing reads as filler; the length is justified by the complexity.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a payment-gated, multi-circuit tool with no output schema and no annotations, this is nearly complete: the return nature (REST endpoint / redirect), the request protocol, error-driven flow, and per-circuit documentation are all covered. Minor gaps remain around what the retry response actually returns and rate/expiry behavior.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real semantics beyond the schema: the per-circuit canonical guides, the optional action-binding rule specific to giwa_attestation (send both domain_separator and action_hash or omit both), and the rule that other circuits do not support actions. The opaque `inputs` object remains circuit-dependent, though it correctly defers to the guides.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource — 'Get the REST endpoint for long-running Noir proof generation' — and immediately rejects the common misconception that the MCP call itself proves ('it does not generate a proof inside the MCP call'). This distinguishes it cleanly from the sibling guide/introspection tools get_guide and get_supported_circuits.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives clear context: use this to obtain the endpoint, then follow the documented POST → 402 → sign → retry flow, and read the canonical guide before preparing inputs. It lacks an explicit 'use X instead when…' routing sentence naming siblings, but the when-to-use and prerequisite conditions are well established.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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