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zkproofport-ai

by app.zkproofport.ai
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prove

Get the REST endpoint for long-running Noir proof generation. This hosted tool redirects; it does not generate a proof inside the MCP call. POST https://ai.zkproofport.app/api/v1/prove POST with {circuit} → 402 challenge with live accepts → sign the selected payment offer → retry with circuit-specific inputs and PAYMENT-SIGNATURE; include X-Payment-Nonce when supplied. Encrypt inputs only when the challenge supplies teePublicKey. Legacy X-Payment-TX requires X-Payment-Nonce. Action binding is optional for arc_eligibility and giwa_attestation: send both domain_separator and action_hash for a signed EIP-712 action, or omit both for an identity-only proof. Other circuits do not support actions. This deployment provides no hardware TEE attestation. HTTPS protects transport, but the prover receives proof inputs. Read the canonical guide before preparing inputs:

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
inputsYesCircuit-specific prepared witness. OIDC uses jwt, jwks, scope and provider; attestation circuits use their own wallet/attestation fields. Read get_guide.
circuitYesCanonical circuit id or supported alias. Read get_guide for the circuit-specific witness and verification chain.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Changed6 schema fields changed
    • changedInput schema / properties / circuit / description
      Previous value: -"Which circuit to use."New value: +"Canonical circuit id or supported alias. Read get_guide for the circuit-specific witness and verification chain."
    • changedInput schema / properties / circuit / enum
      Previous value: -[
-  "coinbase_kyc",
-  "coinbase_country"
-]New value: +[
+  "coinbase_attestation",
+  "coinbase_country_attestation",
+  "oidc_domain_attestation",
+  "arc_eligibility",
+  "giwa_attestation",
+  "coinbase_kyc",
+  "coinbase_country",
+  "oidc_domain"
+]
    • changedInput schema / properties / inputs / additionalProperties
      Previous value: -falseNew value: +{}
    • changedInput schema / properties / inputs / description
      Previous value: -"All circuit inputs required to generate the ZK proof."New value: +"Circuit-specific prepared witness. OIDC uses jwt, jwks, scope and provider; attestation circuits use their own wallet/attestation fields. Read get_guide."
    • removedInput schema / properties / inputs / properties
      Removed value: -{
-  "coinbase_attester_pubkey_x": {
-    "description": "32-byte secp256k1 X coordinate of Coinbase attester public key (0x-prefixed).",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "coinbase_attester_pubkey_y": {
-    "description": "32-byte secp256k1 Y coordinate of Coinbase attester public key (0x-prefixed).",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "country_list": {
-    "description": "ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country codes. Only for coinbase_country circuit.",
-    "items": {
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "type": "array"
-  },
-  "depth": {
-    "description": "Number of levels in the Merkle tree. With 4 signers, depth = 2.",
-    "type": "number"
-  },
-  "is_included": {
-    "description": "true = prove country IS in list, false = prove it is NOT. Only for coinbase_country circuit.",
-    "type": "boolean"
-  },
-  "leaf_index": {
-    "description": "0-based index of the coinbase attester in the authorized signers array.",
-    "type": "number"
-  },
-  "merkle_proof": {
-    "description": "Array of 32-byte sibling hashes (0x-prefixed) in the Merkle tree, from leaf level to root.",
-    "items": {
-      "type": "string"
-    },
-    "type": "array"
-  },
-  "merkle_root": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed 32-byte Merkle root of authorized attesters tree",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "nullifier": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed 32-byte nullifier: privacy-preserving unique identifier",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "raw_transaction": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed RLP-encoded EAS attestation transaction bytes from Base chain.",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "scope_bytes": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed 32-byte keccak256 of the scope string",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "signal_hash": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed 32-byte signal hash: keccak256(abi.encodePacked(address, scope, circuitId))",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "signature": {
-    "description": "65-byte eth_sign signature (0x-prefixed hex, 134 chars). Sign signal_hash with the KYC wallet using eth_sign.",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "tx_length": {
-    "description": "Actual byte length of raw_transaction before server zero-pads to 300 bytes.",
-    "type": "number"
-  },
-  "user_address": {
-    "description": "0x-prefixed 20-byte wallet address with Coinbase attestation",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "user_pubkey_x": {
-    "description": "32-byte secp256k1 public key X coordinate (0x-prefixed hex). Recovered via ecrecover(signal_hash, signature).",
-    "type": "string"
-  },
-  "user_pubkey_y": {
-    "description": "32-byte secp256k1 public key Y coordinate (0x-prefixed hex). Recovered via ecrecover(signal_hash, signature).",
-    "type": "string"
-  }
-}
    • removedInput schema / properties / inputs / required
      Removed value: -[
-  "signal_hash",
-  "nullifier",
-  "scope_bytes",
-  "merkle_root",
-  "user_address",
-  "signature",
-  "user_pubkey_x",
-  "user_pubkey_y",
-  "raw_transaction",
-  "tx_length",
-  "coinbase_attester_pubkey_x",
-  "coinbase_attester_pubkey_y",
-  "merkle_proof",
-  "leaf_index",
-  "depth"
-]
  2. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations provided, the description carries the full transparency burden and does so thoroughly. It discloses no hardware TEE attestation, the fact that the prover receives inputs, conditional encryption via teePublicKey, the 402 challenge/payment flow, and legacy header requirements.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is long but well-structured and front-loaded with the endpoint and purpose. The workflow, circuit-specific options, privacy caveat, and guide links are each relevant; the content is dense but not padded, though a bit more visual separation would improve scannability.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Despite having no output schema, the description covers the invocation workflow, payment headers, circuit-specific action rules, privacy caveats, and authoritative guide links. It is slightly vague about the exact shape of a successful final response or redirect payload, but the operational context is unusually well specified.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real parameter-level meaning: it explains circuit-specific optional action fields (domain_separator and action_hash), identity-only proof behavior, and when to encrypt inputs. This goes beyond the schema's generic 'circuit-specific prepared witness' description.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb-resource pair: 'Get the REST endpoint for long-running Noir proof generation.' It immediately clarifies that the tool redirects and does not generate a proof inside the MCP call, distinguishing it from sibling metadata tools like get_guide and get_supported_circuits.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description provides a step-by-step invocation flow and instructs the agent to read the canonical guide before preparing inputs, effectively pointing to get_guide for circuit-specific preparation. It gives clear usage context, though it never explicitly says 'use get_guide instead of prove for input schemas' or names exclusion conditions.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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