get_vendorOne vendor's or product's CVEs: how many and how severe, per year, how many are known exploited, the top products and weaknesses, the newest and the known exploited ones.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| vendor | Yes | The vendor, any case, e.g. "Microsoft". | |
| product | No | A product of the vendor, for that product alone. |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint=false, so safety and determinism are covered structurally. The description adds useful context by disclosing what the returned profile is composed of (yearly severity breakdown, exploited counts, top products/weaknesses). It does not state behavior for unmatched vendors, coverage ranges, or result size, so it earns only a moderate score.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single dense sentence with no filler, and the resource ('One vendor's or product's CVEs') is front-loaded. The list-of-contents phrasing is slightly awkward and reads as a run-on, but every clause conveys a distinct piece of return-value information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
There is no output schema, so the description must carry the return-value burden, and it does so by enumerating each component of the profile. Combined with fully documented parameters and safety annotations, an agent has enough to call this correctly; only edge-case behavior (unknown vendor, empty results) is missing.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and both parameters are documented there, including that product scopes to a single product of the vendor. The description's phrase 'One vendor's or product's' reinforces the optional product scoping but adds no syntax, matching rules, or case-handling detail beyond the schema. Baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names a specific resource — one vendor's or product's CVE profile — and enumerates its contents (counts, severity, yearly breakdown, known-exploited counts, top products/weaknesses, newest items). An agent can tell this is an aggregate profile rather than a raw CVE lookup. It does not explicitly contrast itself with siblings like get_summary, get_stats, or search_cves, so it stops short of a 5.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage is only implied: the enumerations suggest this is the tool for a vendor-level overview rather than per-CVE detail. There is no explicit when-to-use statement, no mention of when to prefer search_cves or get_cve instead, and no note on what happens for unknown vendors or partial product names.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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