Approve an email
soclo_leads_approveApprove one email so it is sent from the owner's own mailbox. Only call this when the owner has read and approved this exact email.
Input Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| messageId | Yes |
soclo_leads_approveApprove one email so it is sent from the owner's own mailbox. Only call this when the owner has read and approved this exact email.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| messageId | Yes |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=false and openWorldHint=true; the description sensibly adds the real-world effect (the mail leaves from the owner's mailbox) and the human-approval gate. It does not say what a repeat call does given idempotentHint=false (a second approval presumably sends again) or whether approval can be retracted, which is the key risk an agent needs disclosed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, zero filler; the effect of the call leads and the safety precondition follows. Nothing is redundant.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a destructive, non-idempotent send action the description covers purpose and the approval gate but omits what happens on re-approval, error cases (unknown or already-sent messageId), and whether the action is reversible. Annotations carry the safety profile and there is no output schema, but the idempotency behaviour is a real gap.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the sole parameter (messageId, a UUID) is never mentioned in the description. The agent gets no help on where to obtain the id (e.g. from soclo_leads_list or soclo_leads_draft) or what it identifies, so the description fails to compensate for the schema gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific verb and resource ("Approve one email") plus the concrete outcome: the message is sent from the owner's own mailbox. The word "one" implicitly separates it from the sibling soclo_leads_approve_all, but that sibling is never named, so the differentiation is inferred rather than explicit.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Gives a clear precondition for calling: only after the owner has read and approved this exact email. It does not mention the neighbouring paths (soclo_leads_reject, soclo_leads_edit, soclo_leads_approve_all), so an agent must look elsewhere to decide between them.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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