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evaluators

Enclave encryption keys of the evaluators, with TEE attestations binding each key to the published evaluator image. Seal your payload to every key (X25519 + HKDF-SHA256 + AES-256-GCM, see llms.txt).

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "evaluators"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description must carry behavioral disclosure: it does convey that keys are TEE-attested and bound to the published evaluator image, which tells the agent the trust model. It does not say whether this is a read-only fetch, whether the response is stable/cacheable, how many evaluators to expect, or what to do if attestation can't be verified.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two dense sentences, front-loaded with the returned resource and then the crypto usage; every clause carries information. The pointer to llms.txt offloads the cipher-suite detail, though 'evaluators' is used without any definition of what an evaluator is in this system.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description is the only guide to the return value, and it describes it only conceptually (keys plus attestations) without field names or shape. For a key-distribution tool with zero parameters, an agent can decide to call it, but cannot reliably parse or bind the result from this text alone.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Zero parameters, so the schema has nothing to explain and the baseline applies. The description adds the relevant semantic point that sealing must target the key set as a whole, but there are no parameters to interpret.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a concrete resource (enclave encryption keys of the evaluators) plus the attestation binding, so the agent knows this is a key/attestation retrieval tool rather than a market or task tool. It doesn't explicitly contrast with any sibling, but none of the listed siblings appear to expose keys, so confusion risk is low.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

'Seal your payload to every key' implies the intended downstream use and the key-selection rule (every key, not one), which is genuinely actionable. There is no explicit when-to-use/when-not framing, no statement of whether the set of evaluators can change between calls, and no alternative tool named.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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