VHGENGINE

by app.railway.up.engine-production-3bdc

set_webhook

    Hook Detector POSTs signed job.succeeded/job.failed/credits.low (WP-M). `url` https, no
    creds, public host; re-registering ROTATES the secret (a repeat call is not a no-op).
    Verify via X-VHG-Signature: sha256=HMAC_SHA256(secret, raw_body); a webhook.test pings.
    Args: url (1-2048), api_key (admin). Cost=free. Errors: unauthorized, forbidden,
    invalid_request, rate_limited. Returns {url, secret, created_at, events, note,
    test_delivery_id}.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`url`	Yes	https:// endpoint that will receive signed event POSTs. Must be a public host with no embedded credentials. Re-registering ANY url rotates the signing secret, so this is not safe to blind-retry.
`api_key`	No	API key for this call. Omit to fall back to the Authorization: Bearer / X-API-Key request header (streamable-HTTP only), then the VHGENGINE_API_KEY env var (the stdio default). No key resolvable -> unauthorized.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`url`	No	The endpoint now registered.
`note`	No	Human-readable summary, including the rotation warning.
`events`	No	Event types that will be delivered.
`secret`	No	HMAC signing secret, shown exactly once. Verify deliveries with X-VHG-Signature: sha256=HMAC_SHA256(secret, raw_body).
`test_note`	No	What that test delivery is and how to check it.
`created_at`	No	Registration time, ISO-8601 UTC.
`test_delivery_id`	No	A webhook.test ping enqueued immediately; look it up with list_webhook_deliveries to prove your receiver works.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed7 schema fields changedAug 2, 2026

addedInput schema / properties / api_key / description

Added value: +"API key for this call. Omit to fall back to the Authorization: Bearer / X-API-Key request header (streamable-HTTP only), then the VHGENGINE_API_KEY env var (the stdio default). No key resolvable -> unauthorized."

addedInput schema / properties / url / description

Added value: +"https:// endpoint that will receive signed event POSTs. Must be a public host with no embedded credentials. Re-registering ANY url rotates the signing secret, so this is not safe to blind-retry."

addedInput schema / properties / url / maxLength
```
Added value: +2048
```
addedInput schema / properties / url / minLength
```
Added value: +1
```

addedOutput schema / description

Added value: +"The registered webhook. The signing secret is returned ONCE."

addedOutput schema / properties

Added value: +{
+  "created_at": {
+    "description": "Registration time, ISO-8601 UTC.",
+    "type": [
+      "string",
+      "null"
+    ]
+  },
+  "events": {
+    "description": "Event types that will be delivered.",
+    "type": [
+      "array",
+      "null"
+    ]
+  },
+  "note": {
+    "description": "Human-readable summary, including the rotation warning.",
+    "type": [
+      "string",
+      "null"
+    ]
+  },
+  "secret": {
+    "description": "HMAC signing secret, shown exactly once. Verify deliveries with X-VHG-Signature: sha256=HMAC_SHA256(secret, raw_body).",
+    "type": [
+      "string",
+      "null"
+    ]
+  },
+  "test_delivery_id": {
+    "description": "A webhook.test ping enqueued immediately; look it up with list_webhook_deliveries to prove your receiver works.",
+    "type": [
+      "string",
+      "null"
+    ]
+  },
+  "test_note": {
+    "description": "What that test delivery is and how to check it.",
+    "type": [
+      "string",
+      "null"
+    ]
+  },
+  "url": {
+    "description": "The endpoint now registered.",
+    "type": [
+      "string",
+      "null"
+    ]
+  }
+}

removedOutput schema / title
```
Removed value: -"set_webhookDictOutput"
```

AddedJul 22, 2026

TDQS

A4.5/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries full burden. It discloses that the secret is returned only once, re-registration rotates the secret, verification via X-VHG-Signature, webhook.test ping, admin scope, cost, and possible errors. This is exceptional transparency.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is dense but every sentence adds value: purpose, behavior, verification, parameters, cost, errors, return fields. It is front-loaded with the core action and stays focused without any fluff.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Despite an output schema existing, the description does not need to explain returns but still lists them. It covers authentication, scope, cost, error types, event types, and side effects, making it a complete guide for safe invocation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3. The description repeats url constraints (1-2048) and mentions api_key is admin, but the schema already includes detailed parameter descriptions including https requirements and rotation caution. No significant additional parameter meaning is added.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with 'Register (or replace) this account's webhook', a specific verb and resource that clearly distinguishes it from sibling tools like get_webhook or delete_webhook. It also notes the secret is returned once and admin scope, adding precision.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description states when to use the tool (register/replace) and explicitly warns that a repeat call rotates the secret and is not a no-op, i.e., when not to re-register blindly. It does not name alternative tools, so it falls short of full 5.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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