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check_mcp_poisoning

Detect hidden zero-width Unicode smuggling & prompt injection inside MCP tools or web text.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "text": "<text>"
    },
    "name": "check_mcp_poisoning"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
textYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Behavior2/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full disclosure burden, and it says nothing about what the tool returns (boolean verdict, findings list, sanitized text), whether it mutates nothing, or how detections are reported. Naming the threat categories is the only behavioral content offered.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One front-loaded sentence with the action first and the scope last, zero filler. Nothing is redundant or padded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema and no annotations, the description should tell an agent what a scan yields before it calls the tool; that is missing. The threat taxonomy it covers is complete enough for selection, but return-shape ignorance is a real gap for a verification tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% for the single 'text' parameter, so the description must compensate; it partially does by implying the input is an MCP tool definition or web text to be scanned. It does not clarify whether 'text' should be raw JSON, tool metadata, or arbitrary prose, nor any size constraints.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Detect') against a specific threat class ('hidden zero-width Unicode smuggling & prompt injection') and a scope ('inside MCP tools or web text'), which lets an agent distinguish it from the broader 'audit_solidity_or_mcp' sibling. It stops short of explicitly naming when to prefer that sibling, but the narrow detection target is unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied by the input scope phrase ('inside MCP tools or web text') – an agent can infer this is a pre-flight scan of untrusted content. There is no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or named alternative to compare against the audit sibling.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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