check_threat_blacklist
Check entity hashes.
Input Schema
TableJSON Schema
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| target_hash | No |
1cnf-verifier
TDQS
C2.1/5.0
Behavior1/5
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must disclose behavior. It only says 'check entity hashes' and gives no indication of side effects, return semantics, lookup behavior, or operational constraints.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Conciseness2/5
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is short and free of filler, but this is under-specification rather than effective conciseness. It lacks structure and provides only a fragment of necessary context.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Completeness2/5
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema and no annotations, the description needed to explain what result the agent should expect. It does not describe return values, success criteria, or blacklist status semantics, so an agent cannot confidently use the tool's output.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Parameters2/5
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description needed to explain 'target_hash'. It weakly suggests the hash relates to entities, but it does not clarify format, whether multiple hashes are accepted, or how the hash is used.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Purpose3/5
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('check') and names a resource ('entity hashes'), but it does not say what 'checking' means or that these are threat-blacklist hashes. It is not a tautology, but it is too vague to fully distinguish the tool's purpose.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Usage Guidelines2/5
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus any alternative. The sibling tools are only names and provide no basis for choosing or avoiding this tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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TDQS
C2.7/5.0
Disambiguation4/5
Each tool targets a distinct verification concern—hashes, state intervals, agent policies, plan trajectories, embeddings, trade bounds, memory assertions, and risk vectors. The close pairing of verify_1cnf_invariants and verify_liquidity_invariant is mitigated by their clear descriptions, though both being 'invariant' checks creates slight potential for confusion.
Naming Consistency4/5
The overwhelming majority follow a consistent verify_<domain> pattern, making the set predictable. The single exception is check_threat_blacklist, which swaps 'verify' for 'check', creating a minor deviation without breaking overall readability.
Tool Count5/5
Eight tools is well within the ideal range and suits a verification-focused server. Each tool covers a distinct verification category, and none feel redundant or superfluous.
Completeness4/5
The tool surface covers a broad set of verification domains—security, invariants, planning, embeddings, liquidity, memory, and risk. It lacks an aggregate 'run all verifications' or status tool, but the individual coverage is strong enough that agents can perform the intended verification workflows.