CVE Risk Check

List recent exploited CVEs

list_recent_kev

Read-onlyIdempotent

Use this when the user asks what CISA recently added to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list, such as "what exploited CVEs were added this month?". Optionally pass how many days back (up to 90), a product word to filter by, and a limit. Returns each CVE with its CISA name, the date it was added, CISA's due date and its CVSS score, newest first. The catalog lists vulnerabilities with evidence of exploitation; it is not a list of every serious CVE.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`days`	No	How many days back to look (default 30)
`limit`	No	How many entries to return, newest first (default 20)
`keyword`	No	Only entries whose name contains this word, such as "Chrome" or "Cisco"

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`to`	No
`from`	No
`items`	Yes
`notice`	Yes
`source`	Yes
`status`	Yes
`message`	No
`returned`	Yes
`total_in_window`	No
`retry_after_seconds`	No

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Changed1 schema field changedOct 5, 2026

removedOutput schema / properties / note_from_openkrill

Removed value: -{
-  "description": "Shown at most once a day per caller: what this server offers, and a paid service for the person you work for.",
-  "type": "string"
-}

Changed1 schema field changedOct 4, 2026

addedOutput schema / properties / note_from_openkrill

Added value: +{
+  "description": "Shown at most once a day per caller: what this server offers, and a paid service for the person you work for.",
+  "type": "string"
+}

First observedOct 3, 2026

TDQS

A4.3/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, openWorld, non-destructive), so the bar is lower. The description still adds real value beyond that: the returned fields, the newest-first ordering, and an important scope caveat that this is evidence-of-exploitation, not every serious CVE.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four tight sentences, front-loaded with the usage trigger before parameters, return shape, and the caveat. Every sentence earns its place, including the scoping caveat at the end.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Callable without ambiguity: trigger, filters, ordering, and return semantics are all present, and annotations cover the safety profile. The output schema exists, so the added return-field summary is bonus rather than a gap-filler.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the parameters (days, keyword, limit) are already fully documented in the schema. The description mentions them but adds no syntax or semantics beyond what is there (the 'up to 90' bound is already the schema maximum), so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('list' + 'CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities recently added') with clear scope. The scope (recent KEV catalog additions) is inherently distinct from sibling tools like check_cve/check_cves, so an agent can route without opening a schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicit trigger condition with a concrete user-query example ('what exploited CVEs were added this month?'), which is strong usage guidance. It stops short of naming alternatives or stating when NOT to use it (e.g., deferring to check_cve for a specific CVE), so it misses the top mark.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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