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Root bulk-unlinks child wallets or linked wallet self-unlinks

kellian_unlink_identity_wallets
Destructive

Remove wallet(s) from protocol identity membership. The root bound wallet may unlink any linked child (bulk up to 49). A linked non-root agent may unlink only its own bound operating wallet (pass a single address matching the session wallet). No on-chain unlinkAddress transaction.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "targetAddresses": "<targetAddresses>",
      "idempotencyKey": "<idempotencyKey>"
    },
    "name": "kellian_unlink_identity_wallets"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idempotencyKeyYesStable retry key. Reuse only with byte-equivalent tool arguments.
targetAddressesYesWallet address(es) to remove from the identity

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.4/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and openWorldHint=true, so the mutation risk is known; the description adds real context by stating there is no on-chain unlinkAddress transaction (off-chain membership change only) and by spelling out the per-role permission ceiling and the 49-item bulk cap. It stops short of error behavior — what happens if an address isn't a member, or whether unlinked wallets retain history.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Four short sentences, front-loaded with the core action before the role constraints, and the notable 'no on-chain transaction' caveat closes it. No restatement of the title and no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With an output schema present, return values need no explanation, and the description covers the two things an agent must know: permission scope and that this is an off-chain state change. The remaining gap is retry/failure semantics, only partially offset by the schema's idempotencyKey description.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds meaning the schema lacks: targetAddresses must be a single address identical to the session wallet when the caller is a non-root agent, and 49 is framed as a per-call bulk ceiling. It says nothing about idempotencyKey semantics, though the schema documents that fully.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Remove wallet(s) from protocol identity membership') and then decomposes it by caller role: root bulk-unlinks children, a linked non-root agent unlinks only its own bound operating wallet. An agent can immediately distinguish this from the link-consent and link-code siblings without opening any schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives concrete authorization-based conditions for use: root may target any child up to 49, non-root must pass exactly one address matching the session wallet. It doesn't name alternative sibling tools (e.g. generate_link_code / submit_link_consent) as the inverse flow, so the routing guidance is implied rather than exhaustive.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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