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Set file access

set_file_access
DestructiveIdempotent

Sets whether a file follows its drive's access or is restricted, and which teammates or roles may open, edit or manage it.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "workspace": "<workspace>",
      "fileId": "<fileId>",
      "accessMode": "<accessMode>"
    },
    "name": "set_file_access"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
fileIdYesFile or folder id from list_drive_files, search or fetch.
grantsNo
workspaceYesWorkspace slug from workspaces.list, e.g. "acme".
accessModeYes

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
fileYes
grantsYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

No schema history has been recorded yet.

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and readOnlyHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds what is being mutated (access mode and grants affecting open/edit/manage rights), but it never warns that existing grants may be replaced or that elevated permissions are required — the most important behavioral detail for a destructive mutation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One dense sentence, front-loaded with the primary action and free of filler. Every clause contributes: access mode behavior, then grant subjects and permitted operations.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be explained, and the annotations carry the mutability profile. What is missing is the replace-vs-merge semantics of grants and the permission requirements — meaningful for a destructive, idempotent write but not fatal given the structured coverage.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 50%, with fileId and workspace documented in the schema while accessMode and grants are not. The description partially compensates by explaining the inherit-vs-restricted meaning of accessMode and the user/role granting intent, but it omits the read/write/manage action semantics and subjectType distinction. Baseline credit is offset by the remaining gap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource ('Sets whether a file follows its drive's access or is restricted') and explains the two-field effect: access mode plus per-subject grants. It is clearly distinguishable from a pure read like get_file_access, though it does not explicitly differentiate itself from siblings such as share_file or set_drive_access.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no when-to-use guidance, no prerequisites, and no named alternative. The description implies the scenario (changing a file's access policy) but leaves the agent to infer when to use this versus share_file or set_drive_access.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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