Conduit Agentic Commerce

Authenticate agent

agent_authenticate

Two-step re-auth. Call with agent_id only → ES256-sign nonce → call again with nonce+signature. Prefer keys from ~/.conduit ({handle}.credentials.json or legacy credentials.json; CONDUIT_CREDENTIALS_PATH pins one file). After success, merge name/role/description into that file; never overwrite private_key; keep session_token in memory. Do not agent_create if identity files already exist unless the human asked for a new agent.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description
`nonce`	No	Challenge nonce from the first agent_authenticate call (omit to request one)
`agent_id`	Yes	Agent id from the chosen ~/.conduit credentials file, e.g. agt_...
`signature`	No	Signature of the nonce with the agent private key (omit with nonce to get challenge)

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema

Name	Required	Description	Default
`hint`	No
`next`	No
`error`	No
`nonce`	No
`avatar`	No
`detail`	No
`handle`	No
`persist`	No
`agent_id`	No
`mandates`	No
`terminal`	No
`challenge`	No
`created_at`	No
`public_key`	No
`reputation`	No
`open_orders`	No
`permissions`	No
`preferences`	No
`organization`	No
`total_orders`	No
`friendly_name`	No
`payment_rails`	No
`organization_id`	No
`business_profile`	No
`role_description`	No
`human_description`	No
`destination_source`	No
`default_destination`	No
`effective_destination`	No

TDQS

A4.7/5.0

Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Beyond the annotations, it discloses concrete behavioral traits: the two-step sequence, the side effect of merging name/role/description into the credentials file, the invariant of never overwriting private_key, and the in-memory handling of session_token. This goes well beyond what annotations alone provide.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Every sentence earns its place: the two-step flow is front-loaded, then credential path, then side effects, then an exclusion rule. The description is dense but efficiently structured.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-step authentication flow with file-side effects, it covers the full procedure, credential discovery, post-success mutation rules, and the key alternative. An output schema exists, so return-value details are not required. Nothing critical for correct invocation is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds procedural context (ES256-sign nonce, order of calls) but does not add much per-parameter meaning beyond what the schema already explains for nonce, signature, and agent_id.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: it authenticates an agent via a two-step challenge-response flow. It also distinguishes itself from agent_create by explicitly warning not to create if identity files already exist, and the procedural language makes its purpose unmistakable.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives explicit when-to-use guidance: call with agent_id only, sign, then call again with nonce+signature. It also names the alternative (agent_create) and states when not to use it, plus the credential path selection rule, giving an agent clear routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

All Conduit Agentic Commerce tools Inspect

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TDQS

A3.9/5.0

Disambiguation4/5

Most tools map to a distinct resource/action, and the descriptions explicitly call out boundaries (e.g., agent_notify targets Hub users while agent_outreach targets external addresses). A few closely related pairs such as supply_delivery/supply_details and order_events/order_track could still cause misselection despite the clarifying notes.

Naming Consistency4/5

Tool names follow a clear lowercase snake_case resource-prefix pattern across agent_, order_, payment_, and supply_. The pattern is not perfectly uniform because some names are noun-only (agent_organization, payment_methods, supply_details) and order_update_status is a longer compound.

Tool Count4/5

At 19 tools, the set is slightly above the ideal range, but the count is justified by four distinct subdomains: agent identity/communication, orders, payments, and supply. No obvious filler tools are present.

Completeness4/5

The surface covers the main commerce workflow well: agent setup/auth, search and delivery probes, order execution/tracking/feedback/disputes, and payment mandates/methods. Minor gaps like no agent deletion, no payment-method disable, and no standalone order-detail tool are workable or arguably out of scope.

Resources

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