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This connector has been deprecated

This is a duplicate of the actual entry deprecating this in favor of the original.

Remove member

remove_member
DestructiveIdempotent

Remove a member from the organization for good: their sessions, API keys and agent instances stop working. Refused for your own membership, the last active owner, and members your directory manages. Requires a personal API key.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "membership_id": "<membership_id>"
    },
    "name": "remove_member"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
forceNoRemove even while an active escalation path names the member. Without it the call is refused and lists the paths.
membership_idYesThe membership id, from list_members.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.5/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already flag destructiveHint and idempotentHint, but the description adds real value: the cascade (sessions, API keys, agent instances stop working), the exact refusal cases, and the personal-API-key auth requirement. This is behavioral context the annotations cannot express.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three dense sentences with the destructive scope front-loaded, then refusals, then the auth prerequisite. No filler, and each clause carries information an agent needs before calling.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a destructive two-parameter tool with no output schema, the description covers the effect, the guardrails, and the auth requirement, which is everything needed to invoke it safely and correctly.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, and the schema itself documents both membership_id (from list_members) and force (including the escalation-path refusal behavior). The description adds no parameter-level detail beyond hinting at refusals, so baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Remove a member from the organization') with the scope qualifier 'for good', which separates it from update_member or set_team_members among the siblings. An agent can identify it without opening the schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Gives concrete refusal conditions (your own membership, last active owner, directory-managed members) and the prerequisite of a personal API key, which tells the agent when the call will fail. It does not explicitly name a sibling alternative, so it falls short of the top band.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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