delete_webhook_by_idStop future deliveries to one registered webhook. A repeated deletion returns 404.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| webhook_id | Yes | ||
| organization_id | No | Platform admins only: select an organization for this operation. Required when changing another organization’s study or using its wallet. |
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| result | Yes | Webhook deletion acknowledgement. |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Input schema / properties / organization_idAdded value: +{
+ "description": "Platform admins only: select an organization for this operation. Required when changing another organization’s study or using its wallet.",
+ "maxLength": 128,
+ "minLength": 1,
+ "type": "string"
+}Input schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"Input schema / additionalPropertiesRemoved value: -falseInput schema / properties / webhook_id / patternAdded value: +"^([0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[1-8][0-9a-fA-F]{3}-[89abAB][0-9a-fA-F]{3}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}|00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000|ffffffff-ffff-ffff-ffff-ffffffffffff)$"Output schema / $schemaPrevious value: -"http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#"New value: +"https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema"Output schema / properties / result / propertyNamesAdded value: +{
+ "type": "string"
+}Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true, readOnlyHint=false and idempotentHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds real value on top by disclosing the repeat-call failure mode ('A repeated deletion returns 404'), which tells the agent this is not a safe retry. It stops short of saying whether queued deliveries or the signing secret are affected.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, effect first, edge-case behavior second. Nothing is wasted and the important part is front-loaded.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema exists and annotations carry the mutation profile, so the description need not explain returns. For a simple by-id delete it covers the essentials, though it omits the platform-admin organization_id scoping caveat that the sibling mutation tools share.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 50%: organization_id is documented in the schema, but webhook_id carries no description at all. The description says 'one registered webhook' but adds no format, lookup, or requiredness detail, so it fails to compensate for the uncovered required parameter.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific effect ('Stop future deliveries') on a specific resource ('one registered webhook'), which is more informative than a bare 'delete'. However, it does not distinguish itself from the sibling delete_webhook, leaving the agent to guess which of the two deletion tools applies.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No when-to-use guidance, no prerequisites, and no mention of the obvious alternative delete_webhook or of rotate_webhook_secret for less destructive changes. The agent gets no routing signal.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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